Biblical Philosophy: 12 Reason & Apologetics

Table of Contents

1 Born Again Philosophy

2 Born Again Knowing

3 Born Again Believing

4 Born Again Reasoning

5 Born Again Learning

6 Born Again Certainty

7 A Critique of Historical Skepticism

8 A Critique of Reformed Epistemology

9 A Critique of Rationalism

10 A Critique of Fideism

11 A Critique of Postmodernism

12 Reason & Apologetics

Appendix A Detailed Contents

Chapter 2.12

Reason & Apologetics

Unregenerated Reason Can Know About God But Not Know God

Overall Objective

To discuss the limits of God’s purposes for human reason.

Table of Topics

A) Christian Extremes Regarding Reason

B) Reason & Natural Theology

C) Reason & Classical Apologetics

D) Reason & Presuppositionalism

Publications & Particulars

Primary Points

  • The capabilities of devil-darkened reason regarding the knowledge of God have been hotly debated in the Church.
  • Natural theology is the belief that certain truths about God can be known through human reason from observing Creation alone. Some use the concept to claim that Creation is sufficient to provide saving knowledge to humanity.
  • Presuppositionalists insist that until regeneration occurs, humans can really know little if anything about God, or anything else, for that matter.
  • While devil-darkened reason may discern creation’s magnificence, only Spirit-liberated reason will understand its significance.
  • Classical apologists seem to insist that salvation must begin with reasoned arguments for the existence of God and that people can be argued into the kingdom.
  • Christian apologetics is far more valuable for the faith of believers than unbelievers.
  • Until the heart of an unbeliever is regenerated by the Holy Spirit, any spiritual truths may be foolish to them, including a belief in God.
  • Regeneration, not necessarily argumentation, brings saving belief.
  • Unbelievers already know what classic apologists are attempting to prove to them (God exists), but it is not a mental, rational problem that keeps it from being accepted, but rather a spiritual one.
  • In the end, the debate as to whether there are sufficient philosophical or scientific arguments to convince the unregenerate that there is a God seems rather misguided. It depends on the individual.

A) Christian Extremes Regarding Reason

The capabilities of devil-darkened reason [1] regarding the knowledge of God have been hotly debated in the Church. At one end of the spectrum are classical apologists who claim that the existence of God must be and can be demonstrated to the unregenerate before salvation can occur.

Related to this position is natural theology which refers to a knowledge of God acquired through a study of Creation. Natural theologians believe that there are universal truths that can and should prove to any thinking individual that there is a God, apart from any additional revelation from God. At its extreme, proponents of natural theology believe that people can be saved through reasoning, apart from the divine revelation of the Gospel.

At the other end of the spectrum regarding the capabilities of devil-darkened reason is Presuppositionalists who insist that until regeneration occurs, humans can really know little if anything about God, or anything else, for that matter. [2]

This rather wide range of opinion on the ability of devil-darkened reason is illustrated in the following from the Yale Church historian K. S. Latourette (1884-1968) regarding the variations of this theme in medieval theology:

It is significant and sobering that the longer the scholastic method was employed the greater was the tendency to conclude that the truth of the basic Christian convictions could not be proved by the dialectical [reasoning] apparatus.

Anselm [1033–1109] had proceeded on the confident conviction that through reason implemented by logic man could demonstrate at least some and perhaps all of the major tenets of Christianity.

Aquinas [1225-1275] held that some of the truths affirmed by Christianity could be supported by reason and that while others could be arrived at only by the path of faith, none was inconsistent with reason.

William of Ockham [c. 1280- c. 1349] taught that none of the essential features of Christian belief could be proved to the satisfaction of man’s reason but that they must be accepted on the authority of the Church and of the Scriptures. [3]

Our own view in Knowing Our God is best reflected in Aquinas’ view that some Christian doctrines can be appealed to on the basis of reason, including divine Creation. However, as demonstrated fully elsewhere, devil-darkened reason hinders this process. [4]

B) Reason & Natural Theology

Natural theology [5] is a term used to describe the belief that certain truths about God can be known through human reason from observing Creation alone. Some natural theologians use the concept of natural theology to support the claim that universal revelation alone is sufficient to provide saving knowledge to humanity. [6] Perhaps the first Christian to adopt this view was Justin Martyr (c. 100-165) of whom Church historian Jonathan Hill writes:

Justin [believed] . . . if anyone can follow the Logos [universal principle of reason inherent in Christ; cf. John 1:1 [7]] living a rational life, then that means it is possible to follow Christ even if one has never heard the Christian message. So Justin claims that the [pagan] prophets and philosophers who lived before Christ were Christians, even though they did not know it:

We have been taught that Christ is the firstborn of God, and we have declared above that he is the Logos of whom every race of men were partakers. And those who lived according to reason (logos) are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists; as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and men like them; and among the barbarians, Abraham, and Ananias, and Azarlas, and Misael, and Elias, and many others whose actions and names we now decline to recount, because we know it would be tedious. [First Apology, 46]

The notion is an intriguing one and reflects Justin’s benevolent attitude to those of other faiths. It was revived in the twentieth century by the [Roman Catholic] theologian Karl Rahner [1904–1984]. [8]

However, not even the medieval Roman Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas, the recognized “Father of Natural Theology” would have agreed with Justin. Accordingly he wrote:

None of the philosophers before the coming of Christ could, by bending all effort to the task, know as much about God and things necessary for eternal life as after the coming of Christ a little old woman knows through her faith [i.e. revelation]. [9]

Elsewhere, Aquinas wrote:

Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. [10]

At least on this point, the great Roman Catholic theologian was in agreement with the founder of Protestantism, Martin Luther (1483-1546), who likewise wrote:

For where there is no law of God, there all human reason is so blind that it cannot recognize sin. For human reason does not know that unbelief and despair of God is sin. Indeed it knows nothing about man’s duty to believe and trust in God. Hardened in its blindness, it goes its way and never feels this sin at all. Meanwhile it does some works that would otherwise be good, and it leads an outwardly respectable life. Then it thinks it stands well and the matter has been satisfactorily handled; we see this in the heathen and the hypocrites, when their life is at its best.

Besides reason does not know either that the evil inclination of the flesh, and hatred of enemies is sin. Because it observes and feels that all men are so inclined, it holds rather that these things are natural and right, and thinks it is enough merely to guard against the outward acts. So it goes its way, regarding its illness as strength, its sin as virtue, its evil as good; and never getting anywhere. [11]

Natural theology can contain some things about God (cf. Rom 1:19-20). Accordingly, Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) wrote:

I suppose none will doubt but that some natural men do yield a kind of assent of their judgments to the truth of the Christian religion, from the rational proofs or arguments that are offered to evidence it. [12]

However, while unregenerated humans can know some things about God, they are not capable by simple reason to know God. Another way of putting it is that we may be able to prove to some that there is a god, but that does not equal a belief in God. Radical natural theologians are obviously wrong to claim that moral and logical reasoning (i.e. conscience and Creation) are sufficient to bring saving revelation to people. Accordingly, Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson write:

This is how the Christian life begins-with grace and faith, not reason. Reason may play a role and be an instrument in God’s call, but one never becomes a Christian simply by reaching the end of a purely human chain of reasoning and concluding, “Well, I guess if I want to be reasonable I have to believe in God and Jesus Christ.” No, the genesis of authentic Christianity may include a process of reasoning, but it cannot be reduced to that. Faith is that mysterious element which involves personal conviction, an insight from somewhere else, a transformation of heart that inclines one toward God in a new way. [13]

While devil-darkened reason may discern creation’s magnificence, only Spirit-liberated reason will understand its significance. Peter Jensen illustrates this in the following discussion of natural theology which includes the example of some contemporary scientists who recognize the complex design of Creation and yet completely miss its intended message:

[N]atural theology is characteristically exercised free of any supernatural aid through verbal communications from God, which would answer its questions. As the word ‘natural’ suggests, its conclusions may be reached by humans on their own. . . .

Most important of all [for natural theologians], in order for human reason to be capable of discerning the truth by natural theology, the effect of the fall on the image of God in humankind is held not to involve the corruption of the mind. . . .

[There is] a significant theological problem with the whole enterprise [of natural theology], and one that dogs all natural theology. The God revealed by the natural philosophers is not the God of the Bible. . . . Frank Tipler believes that he has proved God and the resurrection of the dead, ‘the central claims of Judeo-Christian theology’, but he denies the resurrection of Jesus and the doctrine of the Trinity.

Indeed, in Tipler the basic theological objection to natural theology, which makes natural theology an unwelcome ally at best, is exemplified. Natural theology’s theory of knowledge is not personal; it does not take into account the relationship of God and humanity revealed in the Bible; it assumes too much for the human intellect and is a form of the pride from which we need to be delivered.

Despite the flourish with which Davies, Tipler and Jastrow announce their results, none of them has become a Christian, for there are parts of the biblical faith with which they cannot agree. Tipler writes as an atheist still, and clearly prefers a version of deism as long as it favors an almost universal salvation. Jastrow began the 1992 edition of his book as he began the first (1978) edition: ‘In my case it should be understood from the start that I am an agnostic in religious matters. My views on this question are close to those of Darwin, who wrote, “My theology is a simple muddle. I cannot look at the universe as the result of blind chance, yet I see no evidence of beneficent design in the details.’”

At most, the general revelation of God, touching us in various ways through human experience, serves to trigger a receptiveness to the gospel, which God may use to call us to himself. [14]

As we discuss further elsewhere, the universal revelation of Creation is rather incomplete and useless without the personal revelation of Scripture. [15]

C) Reason & Classical Apologetics

Therefore, while evidences for the Christian faith are reasonably adequate to prove it, devil-darkened reason is unreasonable. B. B. Warfield (1851–1921) explained:

Evidence cannot produce belief, faith, except in a mind open to this evidence, and capable of receiving, weighing, and responding to it. A mathematical demonstration is demonstrative proof of the proposition demonstrated. But even such a demonstration cannot produce conviction in a mind incapable of following the demonstration. [16]

Such is the case with devil-darkened reason. [17] That is why Christian apologetics is far more valuable for the faith of believers than unbelievers. [18] It was such a belief that led Ambrose (c. 339–397) to say long ago: “It is not by argument that it pleased God to save His people, for the kingdom of God consists in simplicity of faith, not in wordy contention,” [19] which, unfortunately, describes a lot of Christian apologetics today, as discussed elsewhere. [20]

While classical apologists such as Norm Geisler and R. C. Sproul would deny that anyone can be saved apart from saving revelation from God, they do seem to insist that salvation must at least begin with reasoned arguments for the existence of God. Dr. Geisler, for example, writes:

The heart of this [classical] apologetic approach is that the Christian is interested in defending the truths that Christ is the Son of God and the Bible is the word of God. However, prior to establishing these two pillars on which the uniqueness of Christianity is built, one must establish the existence of God. For it makes no sense to speak about an act of God (i.e., a miracle) confirming that Christ is the Son of God and that the Bible is the Word of God unless of course there is a God who can have a son and who can speak a Word.

Theism, then, is a logical prerequisite to Christianity. What is more, an adequate test for truth is a methodological prerequisite to establishing theism. For unless the Christian apologist has a test by which he can show other systems to be false and theism to be true, then there is no way to adjudicate the conflicting claims of various religions and world views. [21]

It would seem that Dr. Geisler believes people need to be argued into the kingdom. How, for instance, does a classical apologist interpret the Apostle when he describes his own evangelistic ministry in Corinth and says: “I resolved to know nothing while I was with you except Jesus Christ and Him crucified” (1 Cor 2:2)? We must always be careful not to neglect the fact that the simple “Gospel . . . is the power of God for the salvation of everyone who believes” (Rom 1:16). The Gospel does not need to be defended as much as it simply needs to be preached! In addition, Dr. Geisler’s intellectual apologetics is far inferior to virtue apologetics in “adjudicat[ing] the conflicting claims of various religions and world views.” [22]

More specifically, classical apologists believe in the universal ability of even devil-darkened reason to believe there is a God, and that such a belief is necessary prior to understanding salvation in Christ. However, this seems to overlook the biblical fact that devil-darkened reason is broken and naturally opposed to such a belief. For example, William Lane Craig, a foremost classical apologist writes:

On balance, then, it seems to me that on the basis of the kalam cosmological argument, a person who is sufficiently informed and whose faculties are functioning properly ought to agree that it is more likely than not that a Creator of the universe exists. This argument can thus serve as one link in the natural theologian’s cumulative case for theism. [23]

Dr. Lane admits that two things are necessary for his approach to apologetics to be successful. First, the person must be “sufficiently informed.” We have noted elsewhere that the fact that such apologetic arguments for God’s existence are so complex, they are significantly limited in their usefulness for most people. [24] How many people have even heard of the “kalam cosmological argument” let alone understand it? Secondly, Dr. Lane admits that the person’s mental “faculties” must be “functioning properly” which the Apostle clearly denies for unregenerated humanity as discussed elsewhere (cf. Rom 1:18-31; 8:1-9; Eph 4:17-19). [25]

Classical apologists are wrong to promote intellectual arguments as an important means of preparing people for salvation. We have demonstrated elsewhere that this approach to evangelism is, in fact, unbiblical. The Apostle Paul intentionally did not give any apologetic arguments in Corinth, and writes: “My message and my preaching were not with wise and persuasive words, but with a demonstration of the Spirit’s power, so that your faith might not rest on men’s wisdom, but on God’s power” (1 Cor 2:4-5). And this was his consistent practice. [26]

D) Reason & Presuppositionalism

While one might say that natural theologians, and maybe even classical apologists, overestimate the ability of devil-darkened reason and evidence, presuppositionalists can underestimate it. This view gets its label from the fact that such theologians believe that there must be a “presupposition,” an existing, yet unproven belief in God, before any truth (spiritual or otherwise) can really be known or useful.

A prooftext of presuppositionalism would be, “The fear of the LORD is the beginning of knowledge” (Prov 1:7). Accordingly, presuppositionalists would seem to claim that arguments regarding the expanse and intricacy of the Universe do not have any value in persuading people to believe in the existence of God. There would also seem to be some relationship between presuppositionalism and fideism in that both are critical of the value of reasonable evidences in playing a part in saving faith. For example, Donald Bloesch writes approvingly of the influential German theologian, Helmut Thielicke (1908-1986) who claimed:

An apologetics which seeks “to show a historical symmetry between prophecy and fulfillment, or to use historical miracles as a ground of faith, or to argue . . . that the resurrection of Christ is the best-attested event in all antiquity” actually destroys faith by giving it a foundation in something that is generally valid. It takes away the wonder of the salvation event and reduces faith to a purely “practical obedience in which I actively confess demonstrable supernatural facts.” [27]

While this reflects classic neoorthodox theology, it would unfortunately seem to reflect the theology of several contemporary Reformed theologians as well. [28] Thus Dr. Demarest explains:

Contemporary evangelical confessionalists [who believe the Bible is essentially the only source of divine revelation] such as [G. C.] Berkhouwer and presuppositionalists in the tradition of [Cornelius] Van Til, while granting the reality of a universal general revelation, end up with Barth in asserting that man can know nothing about God save by supernatural special revelation. [29]

More recently, Donald Bloesch of Dubuque Theological Seminary, Robert Reymond at Knox Seminary, and John Frame at Westminster, could all be lumped into this category of presuppositionalism. Others often given this label include Francis Schaeffer (1912–1984), Gordon H. Clark (1902-1985), Carl F. H. Henry (1913-2003), and Greg L. Bahnsen (1948-1995). However, this view is admittedly hard to pin down. The recognized “Father of Presuppositionalism” is Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987), former Professor of Theology at Westminster. The foundation of his position is summed up when he writes:

Not one single fact in this universe can be known truly by man without [knowing] the existence of God. . . . Applying this to the question of man’s knowledge of facts, it may be said that for the human mind to know any fact truly, it must presuppose the existence of God and his plan for the universe. [30]

Dr. Van Til attempted to clarify his view when he wrote:

The “natural man” is not only basically mistaken in his notions about religion and God, but is as basically mistaken in his notions about the atoms and the laws of gravitation. From this ultimate point of view the “natural man” knows nothing truly. He has chains about his neck and sees shadows only. It is this point on which many theologians are vague. They maintain, to be sure, that the natural man cannot truly know God, but they will not maintain that the “natural man” cannot truly know the flowers of the field.

Now it may seem as though it is straining at a gnat to insist on the point that the “natural man” does not even know the flowers truly, as long as it is maintained that he does not know God truly. The point is, however, that unless we maintain that the “natural man” does not know the flowers truly, we cannot logically maintain that he does not know God truly. All knowledge is inter-related. The created world is expressive of the nature of God. If one knows “nature” truly, one also knows nature’s God truly. [31]

One can see that there are some important truths that Dr. Van Til was attempting to communicate, especially the deplorable state of unregenerated humanity’s devil-darkened reason. Accordingly, there is much in presuppositionalism that we believe is biblical. However, Dr. Van Til has been widely criticized for going too far in disparaging the cognitive abilities of unbelievers. No doubt, he has often been misunderstood, and if one claims not to really understand presuppositionalism at all, know that you are not alone. This is why several long books have been written in an attempt to explain and defend Dr. Van Til’s views. [32]

While the issues are certainly intricate, it would seem critics have gone too far to say that presuppositionalists do not think unregenerated humans can know anything at all. Dr. Van Til himself said:

Apologetics can very well come first and presuppose in general the system of truth brought out in systematics . . . We are well aware of the fact that non-Christians have a great deal of knowledge about this world which is true as far as it goes. That is, there is a sense in which we can and must allow for the value of knowledge of nonChristians. [33]

Part of the problem would seem to be Dr. Van Til’s use of the word “truly” when he states, for example, that the unregenerate “does not know the flowers truly.” “Completely” might be a better word. Even still, who does? As Aquinas said, on this side of Heaven, we never fully understand the essence of anything, not even a flea. [34] This is where presuppositionalists lose the rest of us because surely no one knows even flowers like God knows them. Indeed, it might be said that Christians know the most important thing about flowers (i.e. God made them), but can it be said we know them more truly than say the unsaved botanists who has devoted their life to studying them?

Accordingly, Alvin Plantinga writes:

According to John Calvin, “As soon as ever we depart from Christ, there is nothing, be it ever so gross or insignificant in itself, respecting which we are not necessarily deceived.” Perhaps Calvin means only what we have already noted: one who doesn’t know God fails to know the most important truth about anything else.

He may mean to go even further, however: perhaps he means to say that those who don’t know God suffer much wider ranging cognitive deprivation and, in fact, don’t really have any knowledge at all. (This view is at any rate attributed to some of his followers, for example, Cornelius van Til.)

That seems a shade harsh, particularly because many who don’t believe in God seem to know a great deal more about some topics than most believers do. [35]

Along the same lines, while it is true that God knows more than humans about anything, it is important to insist that, what we do know, can be true. The claim of some presuppositionalists would seem to parallel that of rationalists that we must know everything about something in order to believe or know anything “truly” about it at all. This would seem to lead to a pagan skepticism that does not reflect how God has made us and the world. [36]

Accordingly, “America’s leading Baptist theologian at the turn of the twentieth century,” [37] Augustus Strong (1912–1984), wrote in response to the idea that we cannot know the truth, “Because we can know truly only that which we know in whole and not in part:

If the objection were valid, no real knowledge of anything would be possible, since we know no single thing in all its relations. We conclude that, although God is a being not composed of parts, we may yet have a partial knowledge of him, and this knowledge, though not exhaustive, may yet be real, and adequate. [38]

On the issue of whether we can know truth like God knows it, many have appealed to Isaiah 55:8-9 to support the idea that we cannot. There we read:

For My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways My ways,” declares the LORD. As the Heavens are higher than the Earth, so are My ways higher than your ways and My thoughts than your thoughts.

Gordon Clark responded:

Of course, the Scripture says God’s thoughts are not our thoughts and his ways are not our ways. But is it good exegesis to say that this means his logic, his arithmetic, his truth are not ours? If this were so, what would the consequences be? It would mean not only that our additions and subtractions are all wrong, but also that all our thoughts, in history as well as in arithmetic, are all wrong. . . . To avoid such nonsense, which of course is a denial of the divine image [in us] . . . we must insist that truth is the same for God and man. [39]

For most presuppositional theologians, it would seem that it is their desire to stress the depravity of humankind and their need for saving, regenerating revelation that has led them to criticize the value of rational proofs for God. However, in their attempt to correct the errors of liberal and natural theology, and classical apologetics, some of their conclusions would seem to have overstepped biblical bounds.

The proper interpretation of Romans 1:20 would alone seem more than sufficient to answer some of the extremes of both Karl Barth and presuppositionalists. [40] The reality and universality of this knowledge about God from Creation is precisely why all of humanity is “without excuse.” If the knowledge is not some real knowledge about the “qualities” and “divine nature” of God, than how can God expect humanity “to retain the knowledge of God” (Rom. 1:28) and condemn it for not doing so? Presuppositionalists seem to have no good answer for this. Also, they seem to have ignored God’s own statements concerning the real, substantial, and incriminating effect that He designed His Creation to have on the human mind.

In the end, the debate as to whether there are sufficient philosophical or scientific arguments to convince the unregenerate that there is a God seems rather misguided. It depends on the individual. For some, such arguments have convinced them there is a God, and it would seem wrong for others to say such a belief is not legitimate.

Publications & Particulars

  1. The term devil-darkened reason reflects the Apostle’s description of unregenerated humans as “darkened in their understanding” (Eph 4:18) by “the god of this age [who] has blinded the minds of unbelievers, so that they cannot see the light of the Gospel of the glory of Christ, Who is the image of God” (2 Cor 4:4). Christians however have been “made new in the spirit of [our] mind” (Eph 4:20), giving us alone the ability to receive and understand spiritual truth (cf. 1 Cor 2:12-14). For further discussion of the epistemological differences between these human states see chapters 4.12-16. ↑

  2. For further discussion regarding the debate between presuppositionalism and classical apologists see Bernard Ramm, Types of Apologetic Systems, (Van Kampen Press, 1953) and Sproul, R. C., John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsey in Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics (Academie Books, 1984). ↑

  3. Kenneth S. Latourette, A History of Christianity (Hendricksen, 1975), 519. ↑

  4. For further discussion on the effects of devil-darkened reason on divine revelation see chapters 4.12-14. ↑

  5. Some theologians discuss natural theology under the heading of natural law. For discussions of both these terms see Norman Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (BECA) (Baker, 1999), 415 and 521. ↑

  6. The fact that those believing salvation is possible apart from hearing or knowing the Gospel (i.e. universalists, pluralists and inclusivists) are drawn to natural theology may explain why, as Millard Erickson notes, “natural theologians tend to be Arminian or even Pelagian in their thought rather than Calvinistic or Augustinian” (181). For further discussion of inclusivism see chapter 6.10. For further discussion regarding the meaning and purpose of universal revelation see chapter 7.4. ↑

  7. For further discussion of the concept of Logos and its relation to Christ in John 1:1 see section 2.4.B.2. ↑

  8. Jonathan Hill, The History of Christian Thought (Intervarsity, 2003), 22. ↑

  9. Thomas Aquinas in An Aquinas Reader, Mary T. Clark ed. (Hodder and Stoughton, 1972), p. 404. ↑

  10. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (online at http://www.newadvent.org/summa), I, 1, 1. ↑

  11. Martin Luther, Preface to the Old Testament, Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings, Timothy F. Lull ed. (Augsburg Fortress, 2005), 118. ↑

  12. Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, online at ccel.org. ↑

  13. Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson, Who Needs Theology? (Intervarsity, 1996), 17. ↑

  14. Peter Jensen, The Revelation of God (Intervarsity, 2002), 98, 102, 114-115, 117. ↑

  15. For further discussion regarding the relationship between general and special revelation (i.e. Creation and Scripture) see section 7.2.A. Along the lines we have written here, Alister McGrath writes:

    This idea of ‘natural theology” however, is not to be understood in the sense of ‘access to knowledge of God without recourse to revelation – an idea implicit in [Reformed epistemologist] William Alston’s definition of ‘natural theology’ as ‘the enterprise of providing support for religious beliefs by starting from premises that neither are nor presuppose any religious beliefs’.” Rather, the assumption is that natural theology must begin from premises which are founded on revelation – namely, that the natural order is to be seen as God’s creation. Without this insight, there is no way in which nature can lead to a theology. . . .

    Given the importance of definitions, we must be clear what form of natural theology is being endorsed, and which excluded. I reject any approach which holds that ‘nature provides a foundational resource for Christian theology’. I endorse the following approach:

    A legitimate Christian natural theology interprets nature in a Christian manner – namely, as God’s creation. This involves construing natural theology in line with the foundational insights of the Christian tradition [i.e. Scripture].

    For this reason, natural theology cannot be conceived as an autonomous theological discipline, precisely because its foundational and legitimating insight – namely, that nature is to be viewed and recognized as God’s creation – is derived from divine revelation. ‘Nature’ is not a self-sufficient category, capable of bearing the philosophical weight which an autonomous natural theology demands. In its legitimate and defensible form, natural theology is to be viewed as a legitimate and proper theological exercise to be conducted within the scope of a revealed knowledge of God, rather than as an autonomous discipline outside its bounds. (The Science of God [T & T Clark, 2004], 74, 88-9). ↑

  16. B. B. Warfield, “On Faith In Its Psychological Aspects,” in The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield (Oxford University Press, 1932; Repr. 2000 by Baker), IX: 335-6. ↑

  17. For further discussion of the limits of devil-darkened reason regarding divine revelation and Christian evidences see chapters 4.12-14. ↑

  18. For further discussion on the value of apologetics for believers see section 6.12.C.3. ↑

  19. St. Ambrose, Exposition of the Christian Faith, I.5.42. (online at http://www.ccel.org). ↑

  20. For further discussion of the limits of typical Christian apologetics see sections 2.2.B-C. ↑

  21. Norm Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Baker, 1976), 8-9. ↑

  22. For further discussion of virtue apologetics see Book 5: Biblical Apologetics. ↑

  23. William Lane Craig in Five Views on Apologetics, Steven Cowan, ed. (Zondervan, 2000), 51. ↑

  24. For further critique of the complexity of intellectual apologetics see section 5.14.F. ↑

  25. For further discussion regarding the “insanity of humanity” particularly regarding Creation see section 4.13.A. ↑

  26. Regarding Paul’s evangelistic approach see chapters 5.11 and 5.13. ↑

  27. Donald Bloesch, Essentials of Evangelical Theology, Vols. 1 & 2 (Harper & Row, 1978), 77. ↑

  28. This rejection by Reformed teachers concerning the validity of apologetic arguments from universal revelation is all the more surprising as such Reformed teachers as Calvin, Zwingli, and Edwards supported them (See Warfield, Works, V.41.n. 8). Charles Hodge, for example, felt that “it is perfectly legitimate” to use “theistical arguments” to show “there is a God” (Systematic Theology, 103). ↑

  29. Bruce Demarest, General Revelation: Historical Views and Contemporary Issues (Zondervan, 1982), 21. ↑

  30. Cornelius Van Til, An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Unpublished syllabus, 1955), 14, 22. ↑

  31. Ibid., 26-27. ↑

  32. For example, Greg L. Bahnsen makes such an attempt in his 764 page, Van Til’s Apologetic: Readings and Analysis (Presbyterian & Reformed, 1998). ↑

  33. Van Til, 2, 26. ↑

  34. Aquinas, Summa, I.85. ↑

  35. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000), 217. ↑

  36. Ronald Nash relates the thoughts of Gordon Clark on the topic of God’s knowledge compared to our knowledge:

    While man obviously does not know everything, what man does know must be identical with what God knows. “God knows all truth, and unless we know something God knows, our ideas are untrue. It is absolutely essential therefore to insist that there is an area of coincidence between God’s mind and our mind.” If this conclusion is denied, we are left not only without any knowledge of God, we are left without any knowledge at all.

    The hypothesis of divine omniscience, the emphasis on the systematic unity of all truths, and the supposition that a particular truth derives its meaning or significance from the system as a whole does not imply that a man must know everything in order to know anything. . . .

    Clark’s first level of knowledge (K1) is illustrated by a child’s knowledge of the simple truth that 2 plus 2 equals 4. The second level (K2) is exemplified by the higher mathematician’s knowledge of the relation of the truth (2 plus 2 equals 4) to a system of higher mathematical truth. The third level (K3) is the absolutely complete knowledge of all truths in relation to all other truths. This is the kind of knowledge only an omniscient mind could have. If truth is the whole, then truth must be the object of knowledge in the sense of K3. But man is forever barred from this kind of knowledge [and therefore could never have any truth, including the Gospel]. (The Philosophy of Gordon H. Clark, Ronald Nash, ed. [Presbyterians and Reformed, 1968], 162, 165. ↑

  37. Mark A. Noll, “Strong, Augustus Hopkins,” in Who’s Who in Christian History, J. D. Douglas and Philip Comfort eds. (Tyndale House, n.d. ↑

  38. Augustus H. Strong, Systematic Theology, 3 Vols. (Judson, 1907, 1953), 8. ↑

  39. Gordon H. Clark, “The Axiom of Revelation,” in Philosophy, 76. ↑

  40. Barth, of course, had a rather ingenious and complicated interpretation of this passage which he explained in his famous Commentary on Romans. For a sufficient discussion of this see Erickson, 187-94. ↑