Chapter 2.10

A Critique of Fideism

What is Contrary to Reason is Neither True nor Meaningful for Humans

Overall Objective

To understand and refute a serious threat to the nature of God and truth.

Table of Topics

A) Understanding Fideism: The Worship of Contradiction

B) Refuting Fideism: It’s Not How God Created Things

Publications & Particulars

Primary Points

• While rationalists charge Christianity with contradictions and claim an excuse for not believing, fideists embrace such supposed contradictions and claim that real faith only occurs in the face of them.
• A paradox is defined as: “a statement that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense,” and yet according to fideistic postmoderns, still deserves our faith and trust.
• More specifically, fideism is used to deny that Christian theology must be consistent in order to be true.
• We believe that God intended Scripture to be a revelation, not a secret; a harmonious set of truths from a harmonious Mind; not a bunch of paradoxes to bewilder God’s children, but our Father humbly and carefully explaining Who He is.
• It is the Father’s way and will to teach His children well, and He does this through providing a written revelation with a rather obvious and unambiguous meaning, designed to be rather readily understood by our Spirit-liberated reason which He also designed. Like any good father, God has ensured that the real difficulty regarding His revelation will not be understanding it clearly, but rather, believing and obeying it completely.
• We do expect the teaching of Scripture to be without contradiction, because it is a revelation intended for reasoning humans from a perfectly consistent God.
• “Faith” is not some magical concept that God has given us to simply sweep away the difficulties in the Bible as errantists claim.
• Fideistic theologians are suggesting that humans can do something even God cannot do: hold two contradictory statements as being true.

A) Understanding Fideism: The Worship of Contradiction

While rationalists charge Christianity with contradictions and claim an excuse for not believing, fideists embrace such supposed contradictions and claim that real faith only occurs in the face of contradictions. ^[1] Webster’s Dictionary defines fideism as: “relying on faith rather than reason in pursuit of religious truth.” ^[2] Citing several sources, the Wikipedia article states:

Fideism is an epistemological theory which maintains that faith is independent of reason, or that reason and faith are hostile to each other and faith is superior at arriving at particular truths [especially religious ones].

The word fideism comes from fides, the Latin word for faith, and literally means “faith-ism.” Alvin Plantinga defines “fideism” as “the exclusive or basic reliance upon faith alone, accompanied by a consequent disparagement of reason and utilized especially in the pursuit of philosophical or religious truth.” ^[3]

Elsewhere, Dr. Plantinga, Professor of Philosophy at Notre Dame writes:

Fideism is the belief that particularly saving faith in God should not, and does not have any relationship to reason or evidence, and that real faith is actually demonstrated by believing what is against the evidence and contrary to reason. ^[4]

Likewise, Professors Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli add:

Belief in God, at least from this perspective, would not be rational; one must believe on faith alone. This position, fideism, maintains that one should believe in God in the absence of, or contrary to reason. The most notable fideists are Tertullian ^[5]– “I believe because it is absurd”-and perhaps Kierkegaard, who argued that the God of Christian theism, at least, is truly paradoxical. ^[6]

Some have suggested that fideism is rare these days, but we would disagree, and claim it manifests itself in numerous ways in modern theology. Elsewhere in Knowing Our God we discuss the following:

• Fideism’s popular tendency to dismiss supposed contradictions and errors in Scripture with a mindless “faith” instead of reconciling and dealing with these difficulties with diligent research. ^[7]
• The way in which charismaticism disparages reason and exalts feelings in decision making. ^[8]
• Fideism is reflected in the inclusivism suggested by C. S. Lewis, Walter Elwell, Millard Erickson, and Clark Pinnock. ^[9] Such men suggest that saving faith can come without having a knowledge, and therefore no evidence, of the claims and character of Christ.
• The unbiblical and impractical nature of the subjective “testimony of the Spirit” doctrine. ^[10] This view claims that our assurance of the divine inspiration of Scripture and our own salvation does not ultimately depend on objective evidence, but rather on a subjective feeling supposedly from the Holy Spirit. In other words, it is just another form of fideism.
• Reformed epistemology which insists that it is justifiable to believe in God without reason is yet more evidence that fideism is alive and well. ^[11]
• We have demonstrated the fact that even biblical faith is only as firm as the reasonable evidence we have for it. ^[12]

Several Evangelical theologians reflect fideistic tendencies as well. For example, the Presbyterian Donald Bloesch writes something that sounds spiritual (if not confusing), but is unbiblical when he says:

Faith is not “a resting of the soul in the sufficiency of the evidence” but trusting in the faithfulness of Jesus Christ to speak his Word to all who hunger and thirst for righteousness. ^[13]

Dr. Bloesch’s denial of the need for evidence in faith is echoed by other liberal theologians such as William Dever who writes in his Anchor Bible Dictionary article on “Archaeology, Syro-Palestinian and Biblical”:

What archaeology cannot do, however, even at its best, is to “prove” the Bible in any sense-either by demonstrating that the events claimed by the biblical writers as central to the “salvation history” actually happened, much less by validating the theological inferences that are drawn from these events, whether ancient or modern. The notion that historical proofs can confirm, or even enhance, religious faith is a contradiction in terms. ^[14]

However, it is not only liberal theologians who promote fideism, but it surfaces in more conservative Evangelical writing as well. For example, the rightly respected Pastor of Moody Bible Church, Erwin Lutzer, speaking of evidences for the authority of Scripture says, “historical studies can only take us so far; faith must take us the rest of the way.” ^[15] On the contrary, nothing will build our confidence except evidence and we will get no further in our faith than the evidence we have.

Some object to the term being used disparagingly, but fideism rejects how God has created truth, and created humans to receive and recognize it.

While there are many aspects of fideism that we address elsewhere, here we will focus on its worship of paradoxes and contradictions in hermeneutical and theological issues. Postmodern theology is the foremost promoter of glorifying some kind of faith in the face of paradoxes. A paradox is defined as: “a statement that is seemingly contradictory,” ^[16] and yet according to fideistic postmoderns, still deserves our faith and trust. Accordingly, a postmodern leader in the Church, Rob Bell writes:

It’s not so much that the Christian faith has a lot of paradoxes. It’s that it is a lot of paradoxes. And we cannot resolve a paradox. ^[17]

St. Augustine (354-430) would have mocked such nonsense, and wrote in his City of God regarding the historical spread of Christianity:

The truth was seen to be not contradictory to reason, but only different from customary ideas, so that at length the world embraced the faith it had furiously persecuted. ^[18]

Likewise, philosopher and former President of Wheaton, J. Oliver Buswell wrote:

[T]here are, fortunately, few Bible-believing theologians who take the position (advanced by Kierkegaard and Barth [and Bell]) that we must believe “a paradox” in the sense of a formal contradiction. ^[19]

A recognized founder of fideism was the nineteenth century Christian philosopher Soren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). While his writings contain many orthodox and even helpful things, we would suggest that he unnecessarily disparaged the use of reason in the Christian life. Accordingly, Bruce Demarest and Gordon Lewis write:

The faith Kierkegaard envisaged involves a risk or a “leap” of spiritual passion that contravenes rational arguments and historical evidences. He held that if persons could grasp the Gospel objectively, they would not have to believe. For Kierkegaard the proper object of faith is the rationally absurd. ^[20]

Robert Reymond addresses fideism in its purest form when he remarks:

Some neoorthodox theologians, for example, Emil Brunner [1889–1966], Fredrich Gogarten [1887–1967], and Karl Barth [1886–1968], in their zeal to stress the transcendent, sola gratia character of faith, have denied that saving faith is a human psychic act at all. ^[21]

Fideistic tendencies are found in the writings of the rightly respected German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906–1945) when he writes concerning Christian faith: “Man so surrenders himself to the humiliated God-man as to stake his life on him, even when this seems against all sense.” ^[22] We would suggest that this great German Christian was not being honest even about his own faith and actions which certainly did not go against the objective evidence he had. Properly functioning and God-pleasing humans will not operate the way Bonhoeffer suggested.

Along the same lines, John Gerstner writes to defend Jonathan Edwards against charges of fideism:

It is the modern neo-orthodox theologians who call for a “crucifixion of the intellect.” Emil Brunner takes the ultimate anti-orthodox [and fideistic] position that contradiction is the very test of religious truth: “The hallmark of logical inconsistency clings to all genuine pronouncements of faith.” [Jonathan] Edwards is orthodox, not neo-orthodox. For him, contradiction is the hallmark of nonsense. If consistency is, as [the poet Ralph Waldo] Emerson claims, the “hobgoblin of little minds,” Jonathan Edwards is the most small-minded American philosopher-theologian. According to Edwards, it is not wise but wicked men who hate consistency. ^[23]

More specifically, fideism is used to deny that Christian theology must be consistent in order to be true. Accordingly, many have settled for the idea that the debate over several theological issues is analogous to two parallel railroad tracks that, when in near view, are separated, but in the unseen distance come together in a way God never intended for us to understand. Such an understanding unfortunately forces one to admit the following: 1) God did not really intend large portions of the Bible to be understood by humans, therefore we don’t have to, and 2) God intended apparent contradictions in what He revealed and so if we believe we have encountered one, we can leave it at that.

B) Refuting Fideism: It’s Not How God Created Things

We are not willing to concede either of these. We believe that God intended Scripture to be a revelation, not a secret; a harmonious set of truths from a harmonious Mind; not a bunch of paradoxes to bewilder God’s children, but our Father humbly and carefully explaining Who He is. Accordingly, Moses said:

The secret things belong to the LORD our God, but the things revealed belong to us and to our children forever, that we may follow all the words of this law. (Deut 29:29)

Of course there are “secret things” that God has not chosen to speak about, “but the things revealed” were “this law,” which at this point in Deuteronomy referred to the entire Pentateuch. Notice that Moses did not believe anything in the first five books of the Bible were too difficult for even “children” to understand, because even they were to “follow all the words of this law.” Paul, the premier theologian, wrote one church, “we do not write you anything you cannot read or understand” (2 Cor 1:13). Did he change his approach elsewhere as the fideists seem to claim? ^[24]

The claim among fideists that we do not need to reconcile apparently contradictory statements in God’s word seems to have some possible harmful ramifications. We wonder how their view can be reconciled with article XIV of the Evangelical document, the Chicago Statement of Biblical Inerrancy, which states: “We affirm the unity and internal consistency of Scripture.” ^[25] To the contrary, fideists claim that Scripture contains inconsistencies.

In no other realm of God’s truth (e.g. science, mathematics, history) do we accept the notion that truth can be apparently contradictory. Why should we accept this in biblical doctrine?

Imagine if we interpreted two commands in Scripture as contradictory and it seemed like God was simultaneously telling us to do two contradictory things. What would we do? Accept them both as true and do them both? Not without some confusion and perhaps even an unclear conscience. We know God would not give His children two commands that even seemed contradictory, and we would find a way to reconcile them so we could fully embrace both. Why would we treat God’s doctrines any differently?

For example, in Proverbs we read:

Do not answer a fool according to his folly, or you will be like him yourself (Prov 26:4).

Answer a fool according to his folly, or he will be wise in his own eyes (Prov 26:5).

How are we to treat a “fool”? “Answer” him or “not answer” him? Everyone recognizes these two statements “affirm apparently the direct contrary,” ^[26] so much so that “The apparent contradiction between the two verses led some of the rabbis to question the canonical authority of this book.” ^[27] Do we simply conclude that both are true at the same time and in the same way and are indeed intended to seem contradictory to us like the fideists would have us do with doctrines? No, we understand the need to reconcile these two statements so that we can accurately understand them and correctly apply them. ^[28] What we would never do with biblical commands, we should not do with biblical doctrines.

Likewise, when seemingly contradictory historical statements are found in Scripture, we do not ask believers or unbelievers to simply accept them as “intended to seem contradictory” just because it is divine revelation which need not be logically consistent in order to be accepted as truth. In fact, if the fideist is consistent, he would claim that even the attempt or demand that two historical accounts be reconciled in Scripture, is imposing the authority of human reason over divine revelation. But again, we usually do seek to reconcile the Bible’s historical accounts in order to bolster the trust of believers and unbelievers in God’s word. Why would the fideists claim we are deny biblical doctrines what we strive to do Scripture’s historical accounts?

Even in a court of law God demands that “a matter be established by two or three [agreeing] witnesses” (Deut 19:15; cf. Matt 18:16), and if those witnesses contradict one another, God would not want us to claim we know the truth. How then can fideists insist all of these God-given laws of truth and logic should be changed when it comes to doctrinal truth?

God created Scripture to be understood by humans, truth to be harmonious, and humans to recognize truth only by its logical consistency. Those who would deny these fundamental tenets have the burden of proving otherwise. Merely claiming to see contradictions in Scripture where most respected Bible scholars throughout the history of the Church have not, falls short of such proof. In Scripture, and in all of human existence, a contradiction has been the sure sign of a lie.

Accordingly, in the early Church, whole documents claiming apostolic authorship were rejected as Scripture for one reason–some of their statements were apparent contradictions to what other accepted documents said. Such a foundational process for establishing Christian truth would have been impossible if “apparent contradictions” were accepted in divine revelation.

Therefore, we do expect the teaching of Scripture to be without contradiction, because it is a revelation intended for humans that God created with logical reasoning abilities. How else could He invite us to “reason together” with Him (Isa 1:18)? While it can seem humble to admit there are apparent contradictions in Scripture, we would suggest a better and at least equally humble approach. If two portions of Scripture seem to us to be contradictory, then we should refrain from speaking authoritatively on what either one of those portions of Scripture says. That is the legitimate cost of not reconciling the Bible to the satisfaction of ourselves or others.

Probably the most common reason that fideists are tempted to abandon the requirement of logical consistency for truth in doctrine is that they do not like the result of reconciling the Bible’s doctrines. Perhaps the key area in which fideism is occurring is the debate over God’s predestination of people to salvation and humanity’s free will. Many Fideists are simply unwilling to accept the biblical statement that God unconditionally predetermined the eternal destiny of human beings (cf. Eph 1:4-11; Rom 9:6-24; 11:1-7, 32). Accordingly, they find texts that seem to speak of the free will of humans to choose salvation while ignoring the additional biblical statements regarding their inability to do so (cf. John 6:44; 1 Cor 2:14; 2 Cor 4:4-6; Eph 2:1-9).

Nevertheless, the most respected and influential Bible teachers in the history of the Church have reconciled, at least in their own minds and in the minds of a multitude of other thinking people, the verses that fideists claim are irreconcilable. Others may not agree with how Christians have historically reconciled Scripture, but striving to do so is surely a better approach to the Bible than abandoning the historical definition of what truth is. ^[29]

God created us to discern and grasp truth with reason and He created truth to be non-contradictory. In chapter 2.4 we had written:

Apart from reason and logic there is not even a recognition of reality for humans. ^[30] As one Christian thinker put it: “Freedom from contradiction is a characteristic that belongs to everything that is real . . . and we may therefore use it as a test or criterion of reality.” Likewise, Douglas Groothuis, in his book, Truth Decay, states what should be obvious when he writes: “Even if we could knowingly believe contradictory things, they could not both be true.”

Christian philosopher Ronald Nash comments:

This is why the person who attempts to argue against the law of noncontradiction must make use of the very law he is trying to deny. In the now famous words of McTaggart, “No one ever tried to break logic but what logic broke him.”

Christian apologist Ravi Zacharias put it this way when he remarked, “The more you try to hammer the law of non-contradiction, the more it hammers you.” In other words, without logic, the world makes no sense and therefore ceases to exist for us in any meaningful way. As Christian philosophers Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli put it: “The essential rules of reason . . . are not rules of a game that we invented and can change. They are rules of reality.”

Logical consistency is the basis of all we believe. ^[31] Accordingly, Bruce Demarest and Gordon Lewis, Professors of Theology at Denver Seminary note that:

Many allege that ‘consistency is the mark of a small mind.’ But as one scholar aptly replied, ‘Better a small mind than none at all!’” ^[32]

Accordingly when fideists suggests that real faith is actually demonstrated by believing what is contrary to reason, it is philosophical homosexuality—ignoring and perverting the way God made us. In any other realm of life, do we accept something as true and trustworthy if we also perceive it to be contradictory to something else we believe is true? No. Never. Because neither we nor truth was created this way by God.

Nonetheless, fideists will insist that Christian claims are true even if they have no evidence for them or contradict other established truths. Accordingly, Dr. Nash writes:

As [Lutheran theologian Paul] Tillich [1886–1965] put it, “The truth of faith cannot be made dependent on the historical truth of the stories and legends in which faith has expressed itself. . . . [Nor can faith] be shaken by historical research even if its results are critical of the traditions in which the event is reported.” In other words, faith is immune from difficulties raised in science, history, and philosophy because it belongs to a different domain. Faith can rest in claims that are contradicted by competing claims in science, history, and philosophy.

To his credit, Aquinas would have no part of any of these moves to resolve the conflict between revelation and human claims to truth. Aquinas repudiated the double theory of truth. Two contradictory propositions, even if found in different areas like science and theology, cannot both be true at the same time and in the same sense. If Aristotle should prove to be correct about a certain belief which contradicts Scripture, the Christian should not hedge or hide behind a dubious theory of truth but be honest enough to admit that Scripture is wrong.

But the Christian should also examine every alleged conflict between philosophy and theology. Perhaps the conflict is only apparent or perhaps it is the philosopher who is in error. Aquinas went even further and insisted that faith and reason, properly understood, can never really conflict. God’s Word is true and what God teaches will always be consistent with whatever truth humans discover. The truth of faith and the truth of reason can never conflict logically. ^[33]

Fideism is also apparent in the effort of liberal Bible scholars to claim that Scripture can both be in error and divinely authoritative, all in the name of “faith.” Jack B. Rogers and Donald McKim from Fuller Seminary are representatives of this view and write disparagingly of those who think real truth is without contradiction:

The desire for “certainty” among the post-Reformation scholastics [their cuss word for thinking Evangelicals] was for a tangible, human certainty of the Bible’s inspiration rather than for a divine certainty brought about by faith. . . . The purpose of this study has been to document the fact that a historically accurate and biblically sound alternative exists. There is a middle way between [the] rationalism [of those who believe truth cannot be contradictory] and subjectivism. . . . It is the way of accepting the Bible in faith. ^[34]

While we can appreciate the effort liberal Bible scholars are making to solve the difficult issue of apparent “errors” in Scripture, their solution of repressing our reason and promoting some sort of fantasy faith is not grounded in reality, and is unbiblical, unhuman, and harmful. No matter what Liberal scholars say about their “faith” in the divine authority of Scripture, that “faith” is no stronger than the objective reasons they have for believing Scripture is divine.

Another illustration of fideism has been the frequent suggestion that the way to reconcile supposed contradictions between science and Scripture is to consider each as a separate realm of truth that can contradict the other and yet still confidently be considered true. Accordingly, Drs. Rogers and McKim use the historical example of the medieval English theologian William of Ockham (c. 1280- c. 1349) to support their fideistic approach to Scripture:

For Occam, science and theology were separate realms, each with its own validations. Evidence was used to validate science, and faith was used to validate theology. Neither God’s existence, nor unity, nor infinity could be rationally demonstrated. Faith, for Occam, did not supplement and perfect reason. The spheres of faith and reason were absolutely separate.

The radical character of his approach was manifested in his assertion that reason could, on occasion, contradict faith. It was possible that something contradictory to certain dogmas might be demonstrated by reason. According to Occam, when that happened, the Christian was bound to follow faith even if it seemed to be irrational. In theology, faith was supreme and reason was irrelevant. ^[35]

To the contrary, God created everything, including everything science studies, and the human rationality we use to study and understand it, and because He is the consistent Author of all, there are no contradictions in reality, including the real truth of both science and theology. God certainly does not see such contradictions, and does not expect, nor desire us to claim we possess truth if we see them.

“Faith” is not some magical concept that God has given us to simply sweep away the difficulties in the Bible as errantists claim. This embrace of contradiction in the name of “faith” clearly flies in the face of Scripture. While fideists claim the acceptance of apparent contradictions in Scripture is some kind of virtue, and seems to chide those who would seek to harmonize them, the Apostle wrote: “O Timothy, guard the deposit [of truth] entrusted to you. Avoid the irreverent babble and contradictions [Gr. antithesis] of what is falsely called “knowledge,” for by professing it some have swerved from the faith” (1 Tim 6:20 ESV). Accordingly, we we have written elsewhere on this statement:

Clearly, the Apostle believed “contradictions” were incompatible with “knowledge.” While the Apostle was probably referring to the pagan theories that contradicted the faith, there is no reason to believe that he did not also have in mind pagan theories that contradicted each other, thereby making them false knowledge, and not really knowledge at all. Two contradictory things are not only untrue, but are not even real. Likewise, only that which conforms to human logic is real to the human, because this is how God has made us.

Therefore, Timothy could only do what Paul asked if he recognized statements that contradicted Scripture. And how could he do this if he had to admit that there are apparent contradictions in Scripture itself, all of which must be accepted as truth? If we accept the postmodern approach to interpreting Scripture, why would we strive to reconcile any of its statements? How can we know which apparent contradictions are to be accepted as truth and which ones are not? How could we know the difference between only an apparent contradiction and a real one? Especially if we cannot trust God-ordained laws of logic! ^[36]

Again, not only because of the God-ordained nature of truth, but also because how He made our mind to operate on logic, God never asks us to believe in contradictions. Accordingly, R. C. Sproul notes:

Biblically the contradiction is the hallmark of the lie. Without this formal test of falsification, the Scriptures (and any other writings) would have no means to distinguish between truth and falsehood, righteousness and unrighteousness, obedience and disobedience, Christ and Antichrist. ^[37]

Specifically concerning the law of contradiction Dr. Sproul writes:

The law of contradiction serves as an objective test of coherence. Simply stated the law says, “A cannot be A and non-A at the same time and in the same relationship.” The pen I am using cannot be a pen and not a pen at the same time and in the same relationship. It can be a pen and a pointer at the same time, but this implies a difference in relationship. A passage of Scripture may have many applications and many nuances of meaning, but contrary nuances or applications are intolerable if the Scriptures are of a rational character. ^[38]

While rationalism says a mystery is not true, fideism says it must be believed without reason or against reason. We say that a mystery revealed by authenticated divine revelation is understandable, acceptable, and believable through our Spirit-liberated reason.

Robert Van Kampen wrote in the context of rules for interpreting scripture:

Contradictions are never acceptable. The importance of this principle cannot be overstated. After all passages relating to a specific issue are carefully studied and compared, no interpretation is valid that does not genuinely harmonize with all other passages speaking directly to the same issue.

If God’s Word is inerrant, it cannot be self-contradictory. If two passages seem to be contradictory, truth has not yet been discovered, and no position should be taken. Rather, keep looking. Eventually a higher common denominator will be found that perfectly harmonizes the critical passages in question. Only then does one have truth, not before. ^[39]

Dave Hunt is worth quoting on the need to interpret and reconcile Scripture even if we would often disagree on how he does this on the topics he lists:

God’s foreknowledge, predestination/election, human choice, God’s sovereignty, and man’s responsibility are widely alleged to be mysteries beyond our ability to reconcile. Therefore, some insist that these concepts should be accepted without any attempt at understanding or reconciling apparent conflicts. . . . We respect the many church leaders who continue to offer such an explanation as though that were sufficient. There are, however, several compelling reasons for not acquiescing to that popular position.

First of all, God intends for us to understand His Word rather than to plead “mystery” over vital portions of it. . . . We are to live as Christ said (quoting His own declaration to lsrael through Moses in Deuteronomy 8:3), not “by bread alone, but by “every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God” (Matthew 4:4). . . . Then we must carefully consider and seek to understand every word. ^[40]

On this point, Dr. Reymond is especially helpful in his New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. He writes:

Bible students should be solicitous to interpret the Scriptures in a noncontradictory way; they should strive to harmonize Scripture with Scripture because the Scriptures reflect the thought of a single divine mind.

But many of our finest modern evangelical scholars are insisting that even after the human interpreter has understood the Bible correctly, it will often represent its truths to the human existent–even the believing human existent–in paradoxical [apparently contradictory] terms, that is, in terms “taught unmistakably in the infallible Word of God,” which, while not actually contradictory, nevertheless “cannot possibly be reconciled before the bar of human reason.” [R. B. Kuiper]

It is commonly declared, for example, that the doctrines of the Trinity, the hypostatic union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ, God’s sovereignty and human responsibility, unconditional election and the sincere offer of the gospel, and particular redemption and the universal offer of the gospel are all biblical paradoxes, each respectively advancing antithetical truths unmistakably taught in the Word of God that cannot possibly be reconciled by human reason. ^[41]

One of the rather original authors of this approach to Scripture and reason was Cornelius Van Til (1895-1987) who wrote:

While we shun as poison the idea of the really contradictory we embrace with passion the idea of the apparently contradictory. . . . All the truths of the Christian religion have of necessity the appearance of being contradictory. . . . We do not fear to accept that which has the appearance of being contradictory. . . . In the case of . . . every biblical doctrine, we should seek to take all the factors of Scripture teaching and bind them together into systematic relations with one another as far as we can. But we do not expect to have a logically deducible relationship between one doctrine and another. ^[42]

On the contrary, we do expect the teaching of Scripture to be without contradiction, because it is a revelation intended for reasoning humans from a perfectly consistent God.

Likewise, one “of our finest modern evangelical scholars,” who has seemed to suggest we should believe something against reason and with apparent contradictions is none other than one of our very favorite theologians, J. I. Packer. In his well-known book, Evangelism & the Sovereignty of God, Dr. Packer addresses the supposed problem of reconciling “the apparent opposition between divine sovereignty and human responsibility.” ^[43] Evidently, in his estimation, they are irreconcilable and contradictory to the human mind. Therefore, Dr. Packer labels these theological theories as an antinomy, or apparent contradiction.

In response to Dr. Packer, John Piper has written:

In his book Evangelism and the Sovereignty of God J. I. Packer argues that the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man is an antinomy. He defines “antinomy” as “an appearance of contradiction between conclusions which seem equally logical, reasonable or necessary” (p. 18). It “is neither dispensable nor comprehensible . . . It is unavoidable and insoluble. We do not invent it, and we cannot explain it” (p. 21). God “orders and controls all things, human actions among them” . . . yet “He holds every man responsible for the choices he makes and the courses of action he pursues” (p. 22). “To our finite minds this is inexplicable” (p. 23).

The first thing to notice here is that the antinomy as Packer sees it is not between the sovereignty of God and the free will of man. Packer is too good a biblical scholar to think there ever was such a thing as “free will” taught in the scripture. Thus the whole conversation between him and myself can proceed on the cordial agreement that free will is an unbiblical notion that is not part of the antinomy because it is not part of revelation.

But now I would like to ask where Packer gets the idea that this so-called antinomy between the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man is “inexplicable” to our finite minds? Does he simply have an intuitive feeling that we can’t understand the unity of these two truths? Or is it that he has tried for 40 years to explain it and has found that he can’t? Or does he appeal to the endless disputes in the church on this subject? Packer does not tell us why he thinks the antinomy is an antinomy. He simply assumes that “it sounds like a contradiction” to everybody.

He also assumes that anyone who is discontent with antinomy and tries to probe into the consistency of its two halves is guilty of suspicious speculations (p. 24). I disagree with both assumptions: everybody does not think the sovereignty of God and the responsibility of man are apparently contradictory (for example Jonathan Edwards), nor is it in my judgment, improper to probe into the very mind of God if done in the right spirit. ^[44]

While such statements from Drs. Van Til and Packer admitting to apparent contradictions in Scripture certainly exhibit good old fashioned Christian humility, as we suggested above, there is a better and equally humble approach. If two portions of Scripture do not agree, or seem to contradict one another, then no human can speak authoritatively on what either one of those portions of Scripture is teaching.

For example, if Scripture’s teaching concerning the Incarnation seems contradictory to someone, then they are in no position to dogmatically assert either the humanity or the deity of Jesus Christ. Those two things can only be meaningful or true to a human if they are reconciled into a harmonious concept, because dependable truth cannot be gained from contradictions, real or apparent. This is a fundamental rule of biblical interpretation and it should not be violated in the name of fideism. In the case of the Incarnation, the only reason we can teach authoritatively on the two natures of Christ is that we can formulate, without violating reason, that in the virginal conception of Christ through God the Holy Spirit, Jesus Christ was two distinct and complete natures in one Person. As noted above, while there is certainly mystery in such a statement, there is no logical contradiction.

Our point here is saying nothing more than the fact that there are portions of Scripture for which we are not confident concerning its proper interpretation. And when that is the case, we humbly admit that we do not understand, and cannot authoritatively teach what truth God intended to communicate in that passage. Such an approach is acceptable, and sometimes even commendable. What does not seem acceptable or commendable is authoritatively teaching two things that we think and admit seem contradictory to us.

David Basinger, Professor of Philosophy at Roberts Wesleyan College, in an excellent article in the Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society concerning this very issue of theological fideism writes:

[I]f two seeming truths are really incompatible, then reinterpretation or suspension of judgment is necessary. In short, given my analysis, “self-contradictory” is not simply the label for a category into which some Biblical truths may need to be placed, as it appears to be for the theologians of paradox. Rather the law of noncontradiction is a tool that must be used to identify Biblical truth in the first place. ^[45]

Fideistic theologians often imply that it is human pride that demands that communication from God be without contradiction. On the contrary, we are simply admitting that this is the way God has made us. Likewise, the same theologians will appeal to a worshipful sense of God’s transcendence in order to put a positive spin on what they claim are contradictions in Scripture. Accordingly, Dr. Basinger remarks:

[T]here has often been a misplaced emphasis on human finitude . . . [by theologians of paradox]. [They] are surely right in maintaining that God’s ways are above our ways. It would be foolish to contend that we as finite humans could understand God exhaustively. But it is unjustifiable to use this fact as a basis for affirming Biblical paradox.

It is unjustifiable, for example, for Packer to support paradox by arguing that “a God whom we could understand exhaustively, and whose revelation of Himself confronted us with no [paradoxes] whatsoever, would be a God in man’s image.” [Evangelism & the Sovereignty of God, 24] For to ask whether a Biblical concept is paradoxical is solely to ask whether it is logically consistent—that is, it is to ask whether the terms are being defined in such a way that to affirm one is to deny the other. And the fact that we do not know how or why God has done certain things is irrelevant to this point. In other words, we can readily admit our human finitude without granting that Biblical truth is paradoxical. To maintain otherwise is, as I have repeatedly argued, to confuse paradox with mystery.

Second, there has often been a misplaced emphasis on the relevance of Biblical authority. The theologians of paradox often ask challengers why they hesitate to trust what God says. But this type of comment, we have seen, basically begs the question. Those who deny the existence of Biblical paradox do not normally do so because they do not believe revelation to be normative or because they have placed reason above faith. They do so because they do not think that God—whom they trust—has actually given us concepts that are to be understood in the manner done so by the theologians of paradox. In other words the dispute, as I see it, is one of exegesis and not of authority. ^[46]

Many doctrinal topics including the Incarnation and the Trinity illustrate the important distinction between a mystery and a paradox. Dr. Basinger writes:

I shall use the term “mystery” to refer to those concepts that are not (and may never be) open totally to human explanation. For example, we as humans may never be able to explain how God could have become a human or how God could have created something out of nothing or how God could have raised someone from the dead. But none of these concepts is self-contradictory. The means by which such events were brought about may never be open to us as humans. Perhaps such means would not even be comprehensible from a human perspective. But all of the states of affairs in question are logically possible, given the normal definitions of the terms involved. ^[47]

A common illustration that is used to support the idea that two apparent contradictions can simultaneously be accepted as true is that scientists have explained light as both a wave and particles. The claim is that it is scientific fact that they are simultaneously true, and therefore, we can accept simultaneous contradictions in Scripture as well. Dr. Basinger responds:

[W]hat of the claim that science furnishes a counter to my argument [that paradoxes are unacceptable in interpreting divine revelation]? Consider, for example, Packer’s reference to the well-known controversy over the true nature of light. “There is equally cogent evidence that light is composed of particles and that light is composed of waves. Our minds want to reject one in favor of the other. But the evidence is there. Thus, serious scientists have no choice but to hold the two seemingly incompatible truths together; both must be treated as true.” [Evangelism & the Sovereignty of God, 19] And accordingly, he concludes, we should find no problem in principle in applying such paradoxical reasoning to Biblical teaching.

Unfortunately this analogy is dubious. . . . [T]heoretical scientists have never made the claim, as the theologians of paradox seem to with respect to Biblical truths, that two incompatible propositions can in fact be simultaneously true. Physicists, for example, have never claimed that light is in fact simultaneously both wholly particle and wholly wave, where “wave” and “particle” are defined in such a way that the terms are contradictory. The claim of the scientist, rather, is only that there is at times no good basis for considering either of two seemingly incompatible propositions false. [It’s difficult to say whether light is in particle or wave form at any given time]. And this is a much different, weaker claim than its alleged theological counterpart. For only the claim that two incompatible propositions are in fact simultaneously true threatens the meaning of the concepts involved. ^[48]

In other words, because light appears to be two contradictory things, scientists do not speak authoritatively on what light really is, or make dogmatic claims about either its wave-like or particle-like properties. They understand that because there appear to be two contradictory truths concerning the makeup of light, they are limited in whatever truth they have about its makeup at all.

And this illustrates our earlier point about responsible interpretation of the Bible. If one thinks that there are two related but contradictory teachings in Scripture, they are in no position to speak authoritatively about what the relationship is, or even what either of the apparently irreconcilable concepts mean, until they have sufficiently reconciled them in their own mind, and can do so for others as well.

Dr. Reymond suggests other problems with a fideistic approach to Scripture as well. First, just because one person claims that two passages/teachings of Scripture seem incompatible, does not mean that the rest of us need to admit the same. In other words, it is one thing to say that one personally sees a paradox in Scripture, but it is another to then assume that is the way Scripture really is, or that this was God’s intention. As Dr. Reymond puts it:

Merely because any number of scholars have failed to reconcile to their satisfaction two given truths of Scripture is no proof that the truths cannot be harmonized. And if just one scholar claims to have reconciled the truths to his or her own satisfaction, this ipso facto renders the definition [of paradox] both gratuitous and suspect. ^[49]

Secondly, Dr. Reymond points out that while Evangelical theologians claim that the contradictions in Scripture are only apparent instead of actual, we must ask how can we know the difference? He writes:

[I]f actually noncontradictory truths can appear as contradictories and if no amount of study or reflection can remove the contradiction, there is no available means to distinguish between this “apparent” contradiction and a real contradiction. Since both would appear to the human existent in precisely the same form and since neither will yield up its contradiction to study and reflection, how does the human existent know for certain that he is “embracing with passion” only a seeming contradiction and not a real contradiction [which would lead to deception]? ^[50]

This results in a third problem because statements that even seem contradictory can have no real meaning for humans because of the way in which God has created us. Fideistic theologians are suggesting that humans can do something even God cannot do: hold two contradictory statements as being true. Propositions do not even become true for God unless they are reconciled in His understanding because that is how He has created truth to be. It is because He can fully reconcile everything in what He has revealed that for Him it is true. And if contradiction has no meaning for God, how can we expect it to have meaning for us. Accordingly, Dr. Reymond concurs that if the Trinity is a real contradiction, that, “This is a real contradiction which not even God can resolve! Nor would he even try to do so!” ^[51]

This problem becomes all the more apparent when we are reminded that God intended and designed Scripture to be an effective revelation to humans, not a meaningless riddle. Accordingly, Dr. Basinger writes:

If concepts such as human freedom and divine sovereignty are really contradictory at the human level, then . . . they are at the human level comparable to the relationship between a square and a circle. Now let us assume that God has told us in Scripture that he had created square circles. . . . The fundamental problem would be one of meaning.

We can say the phrase “square circle,” and we can conceive of squares and we can conceive of circles. But since a circle is a nonsquare by definition and a square is noncircular by definition, it is not at all clear that we can conceive of a square circle–that is, conceive of something that is both totally a square and totally a circle at the same time. This is because on the human level, language [which is the means of communication God has chosen in Scripture] presupposes the law of noncontradiction. . . .

But what if we were to add that the concept of a square circle is not contradictory from God’s perspective and thus that to him it is meaningful? Would this clarify anything? This certainly tells us something about God: that he is able to think in other than human categories. But it would not make the concept any more meaningful to us. Given the categories of meaning with which we seem to have been created, the concept would remain just as meaningless from our perspective as before. ^[52]

In other words, an apparently contradictory revelation is meaningless and therefore not a revelation at all.

What is specifically being attacked in fideistic and paradoxical theology is the historical perspectives of the “analogy of faith” or the “analogy of Scripture” which has emphasized the coherency and unity of Christian theology since the beginning. OT scholar Walter Kaiser and NT scholar Moises Silva write:

Since the mind governing Scripture is one, is it not appropriate and fair to God the Holy Spirit to gather his total thinking on a particular subject, much as we might do with the writings of a human author? And if comrnunication is assumed, do we not grant that the writer exhibits coherence and unity in his or her thought until proven otherwise? Why should biblical scholars assume less, unless they reject the idea of a unified divine mind behind the entirety of Scripture?

The presumption against the unity of the Bible, more than any other factor, has spoiled evangelicals and turned them away from searching for any inner unifying principles in biblical theology or biblical ethics and from appreciating the legitimacy of systematic theology. . . . The Enlightenment and the advent of the higher-critical method have led many within the church to reject (either in an outright or an implicit way) the unity of Scripture as a viable doctrine or a usable hermeneutical feature. This has left many contemporary readers of the Bible bewildered and without any organizing principle or method by which to put the whole story of the Bible together. These principles must be revived again. ^[53]

Finally, Dr. Reymond warns that such fideistic theology has grave consequences:

[O]nce one asserts that a truth may legitimately assume the form of an irreconcilable contradiction, he has given up all possibility of ever detecting a real falsehood. Every time he rejects a proposition as false because it “contradicts” the teaching of Scripture or because it is in some other way illogical, the proposition’s sponsor only needs to contend that it only appears to contradict Scripture or to be illogical . . .

But this means both the end of Christianity’s uniqueness as the revealed religion of God since it is then liable to–nay, more than this, it must be open to–the assimilation of any and every truth claim of whatever kind, and the death of all rational faith.

Now if one has already conceded that the Bible itself can and does teach that truths may come to the human existent in paradoxical terms, it begs the question to respond to this by insisting that one must simply believe what the Bible says about these other claims to truth and reject those that contradict the Bible. Why should either proposition of the “declared” contradiction be preferred to the other when applying Scripture to a contradicting truth claim? Why not simply live with one more unresolved antithesis? . . .

Not to set the goal of quarrying from Scripture a harmonious theology devoid of paradoxes is to sound the death knell not only to systematic theology but also to all theology that would commend itself to men as the truth of the one living and rational God. ^[54]

Dr. Reymond rightly concludes in our opinion:

The only solution is to deny to paradox, if understood as irreconcilable contradictories, a legitimate place in a Christian theory of truth, recognizing it for what it is–the offspring of an irrational age. If there is to be an offense in Christianity’s truth claims, it should be the ethical implications of the cross of Christ and not the irrationality of contradictories proclaimed to men being both true. . . .

[T]he notion that any of God’s truth will always appear to the human existent as contradictory must be rejected. Specifically, the notion that the cardinal doctrines of the faith–the Trinity, the person of Christ, the doctrines of grace–when proclaimed aright must be proclaimed as contradictory constructs is a travesty. . . .

Let no one conclude from this rejection of paradox as a legitimate hermeneutical category that I am urging a Cartesian rationalism that presupposes the autonomy of human reason and freedom from divine revelation, a rationalism which asserts that it must begin with itself in the buildup of knowledge. But make no mistake: I am calling for a Christian rationalism that forthrightly affirms that the divine revelation which it gladly owns and makes the bedrock of all its intellectual efforts is internally self-consistent, that is, noncontradictory. ^[55]

God never intended “faith” to be a substitute or excuse for a lack of evidence or reasoning. Another great NT scholar, Donald Guthrie, writes in the popular Tyndale commentary series: “the writer [of Hebrews] recognizes the need for a leap of faith,” ^[56] to believe God created the Universe, using a virtual synonym for fideism. On the contrary, our belief that “the Universe was formed at God’s command” (Heb 11:3) means nothing of the kind, because there is abundant, objective, observable evidence that God did indeed create the Universe.

Along the same lines, Paul Feinberg, Professor of Biblical and Systematic Theology at Trinity writes:

There are compelling reasons to think there are some individuals who are within their epistemic rights in believing in God’s existence and the Christian faith without evidence. Among those in this class are young children, adults who are devout but theologically uneducated, and even learned theological professors. ^[57]

What this fine professor would seem to be ignoring is the fact that the testimony of a person perceived to be trustworthy is evidence for a belief. Therefore, even a blind person can have sufficient evidence that God created the Universe without ever seeing the evidence, if a legitimately trusted friend tells him so. Contrary to Dr. Feinberg then, young children and uneducated adults still must have evidence for a belief in God, but it may not come from a personal accumulation of intellectual apologetic evidence.

While proponents of the above positions would not agree with all of the tenets of fideism, aspects of their theologies certainly reflect some of the most unfortunate and unbiblical aspects of this position. All of this suggests that this erroneous and dangerous perspective of fideism is flourishing today.

We suggest that any philosophy that unnecessarily or illegitimately disparages the God-given place of reason and evidence for Christian faith, deserves the traditionally incriminating label of fideism. This perspective makes faith an impulsive feeling instead of a reasoned decision, and falls into the common fallacy noted elsewhere of separating our reason from a supposed will as if they can act independently of one another. ^[58]

While the faith of fideists can sound more spiritual, and provide a ready answer to a supposed lack of evidence for Christian claims, it is an empty faith, built on the shifting sands of feelings, rather than the God-given faculty of reason. As we have said before, one proof of the truth of any philosophy is that it works in the real world. Fideism does not. As William Abraham remarks:

As we have seen, fideists find it difficult to avoid all talk of justification or reasons for belief. [Alvin] Plantinga [a Reformed epistemologist] speaks of justifying circumstances. [Blaise] Pascal [historically viewed as a fideist] speaks of reasons of the heart. [Soren] Kierkegaard [the most famous fideist] even dares to speak of proof. ^[59]

Contrary to several fideistic beliefs, the great twentieth century English preacher D. M. Lloyd-Jones explained:

We can never by means of an intellectual process bring ourselves into the truth and into the kingdom of God. That is true. But it is equally important that we should remember that Christianity is not unreasonable and never irrational-never! You cannot reason yourself into it, but the moment you are in it you find that it is the most reasonable and rational thing of all . . . .

How, then, does one become a Christian? It happens like this: the Holy Spirit enlightens the understanding. He does not make us Christians apart from the understanding. What he does is to lift the understanding up to a higher level.

There is nothing wrong with reason except that it is governed by a sinful disposition, and that is why it can never bring us into Christianity or into the kingdom. But the Spirit can lift up the mind and the reason. A man is never saved against his reason and his understanding-never! What happens is that his understanding and his reason are enabled to see the truth which he formerly rejected. ^[60]

Likewise, B. B. Warfield wrote:

[T]he mystical tendency is manifesting itself at the present day most distinctly in a widespread inclination to set aside apologetics in favor of the “witness of the Spirit.” The convictions of the Christian man, we are told, are not the product of reason addressed to the intellect, but the immediate creation of the Holy Spirit in the heart. Therefore, it is intimated, we may do very well without these reasons, if indeed they are not positively noxious, because tending to substitute a barren intellectualism for a vital faith.

It seems to be forgotten that though faith be a moral act and the gift of God, it is yet formally conviction passing into confidence; and that all forms of convictions must rest on evidence as their ground, and it is not faith but reason which investigates the nature and validity of this ground.

“He who believes,” says Thomas Aquinas, in words which have become current as an axiom, “would not believe unless he saw that what he believes is worthy of belief.” Though faith is the gift of God, it does not in the least follow that the faith which God gives is an irrational faith, that is, a faith without cognizable ground in right reason. We believe in Christ because it is rational to believe in Him, not even though it be irrational.

Of course mere reasoning cannot make a Christian; but that is not because faith is not the result of evidence, but because a dead soul cannot respond to evidence. The action of the Holy Spirit in giving faith is not apart from evidence, but along with evidence; and in the first instance consists in preparing the soul for the reception of the evidence. ^[61]

Even Donald Bloesch, who is openly sympathetic to fideistic views, writes:

[Saving] Faith is given to man directly from God, but it does not operate independently of reason and the senses. It can be said to convert or redirect our reason. [Saving] Faith does not overthrow reason but places it on a new foundation. . . . When man’s will is turned in a new direction, he is then enabled to reason in the light of faith. [Saving] Faith is not an act of the will in which reason is suspended, but it is a rational commitment. . . .

Reason is involved in faith at the very beginning, but it is not the foundation [source] of faith. Augustine is right that we must understand the words of the gospel before we can commit ourselves to him who is the content of the gospel, but this is not true understanding, only external apprehension. We do not truly understand [accept] until our inward eyes are opened by the Spirit of God to discern the depth of meaning contained in the gospel. ^[62]

This is precisely why even the inclusivist C. S. Lewis said:

I am not asking anyone to accept Christianity if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of evidence is against it. That is not the point at which Faith comes in. ^[63]

Hopefully, one can understand why we have taken such pains to biblically demonstrate that God-pleasing faith always depends on evidence. The beliefs of fideism are too ingrained in Christianity and its effects too harmful in order to do otherwise. ^[64]

Publications & Particulars

1. A related concept to fideism is existentialism. Millard Erickson provides one of the more succinct descriptions of existentialism, although it is a very difficult concept to accurately and fully define:

   There are many aspects or dimensions to the tenet of [extentialism]. Basically it is the contention that reality cannot be captured within, or reduced to, intellectual concepts. It goes beyond them, or breaks out of them. Further it is not possible to put ideas into a logical system . . . Humans can detect no discernible pattern of meaning. The meaning of reality must be created by one’s own free choice. (Christian Theology, 2nd ed., [Baker, 1998, 46.)

   Existentialism is essentially anti-rational (many would say plain irrational), downplaying to a great degree the value of God-given reason. Individualism and autonomy are characteristic as well. In addition, Dr. Erickson says, “The final tenet of existentialism is subjectivity . . . Where the object evokes great inward passion or subjectivity, there is truth. This is the really important type of truth” (Ibid., 47).

   Finally, Dr. Erickson notes:

   Of all philosophies existentialism has probably been the one most widely utilized and even adopted by theologians in the twentieth century, particularly from about 1920 to 1950 or 1960. The major influence of Soren Kierkegaard was not on his day but on those who lived two and three generations after his time. Karl Barth, for example, recognized the presence of Kierkegaardian thought in his first attempt at writing a dogmatics, and even though he attempted to purge it from his later writing there is some question whether he ever fully succeeded. And the indebtedness of Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr to Kierkegaard is clear, as is the existentialist basis of the thought of Paul Tillich and Rudolf Bultmann.

   There have been various effects of this existentializing of theology. First is the subjectivizing of truth. Truth is truth when it becomes truth for me. It is not to be thought of as an objective set of propositions; it must be assimilated by someone if it is to be regarded as truth. Second is the separation of religious truth from more objective types of truth in general. Unlike these other types of truth revelation does not come through general culture. A third result of the existentializing of theology is a nonsubstantive or nonessentialist view of religious reality. Truth, sin, and salvation are not fixed substances, “blocks of reality,” or permanent states. They are dynamic occurrences. (Ibid., 47). ↑

2. Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary:http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/fideism ↑

3. Online at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fideism#cite_ref-0 ↑

4. Plantinga, 247. ↑

5. While many would add to the list of fideist such names as Tertullian (c. 160-c. 220) and Pascal (1623-1662), their overall perspective and high regard for reason, and even apologetics, suggests against this. Norman Geisler writes of Tertullian:

   As a lawyer and defender of the Christian Faith, Tertullian knew well the value of human reason in the declaration and defense of the Christian Faith. . . . He also speaks of applying “the rule of reason” as the guiding principle in the interpretation of Scripture (Prescription Against Heretics, 9). . . . Despite his strong emphasis on faith, Tertullian, like Justin and Clement, believed there was a significant role for human reason in defense of the truth of the Christian religion (Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics [Baker, 1999], 722).

   Accordingly, John Gerstner adds:

   Tertullian (c. 160-c. 220), at first glance, seems a glaring contradiction of the thesis that the Early Church honored the rational theistic approach to faith. . . . . However, Tertullian opposes the abuse and not the use of philosophy. (The Rational Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 3 vols. [Berea, 1991], I.26-7)

   Along the same lines, Church historian Jonathan Hill interprets Tertullian’s phrase, “it is definitely to be believed, because it is absurd . . . it is certain, because it is impossible” (On the Flesh of Christ, 5), as follows: “His point, of course, is not that Christianity is stupid or contrary to reason: it is that it is so extraordinary that no one could have made it up.” (The History of Christian Thought, [Intervarsity, 2003], 39.)

   Likewise, Geisler writes of Pascal:

   Pascal, while emphasizing the heart and faith, is not a fideist. In Pensees no. 149 he puts into Jesus’ mouth these words:

   I do not mean you to believe me submissively and without reason; I do not claim to subdue you by tyranny. Nor do I claim to account for everything. . . . I mean to show you by clearly, by convincing proofs, marks of divinity within me which will convince you of what I am, and establish my authority by miracles and proofs that you cannot reject, so that you will then believe the things I teach, finding no reason to reject them but your own inability to tell whether they are true or not (584).

   This is clearly not fideism. John Stackhouse writes concerning Pascal:

   Blaise Pascal, the great seventeenth-century scientist and public debater, believed that reason was a great gift. He drew on his considerable supply of that gift in many causes, from developing the barometer and early calculating machines to disputing over the nature of Christian doctrine and piety with the finest minds of his society.

   Yet Pascal himself recognized that “the heart has its reasons that reason does not know.”‘ He did not mean anything sentimental by this oft-quoted statement. Instead, he meant that the inner self, the very core of a person, can apprehend the intrinsic validity of something or someone in a way not always open to rational analysis.

   Uneducated and unintelligent people, this great intellectual declared, can be more certain of the fundamental truths of our existence than the subtlest philosophers and most learned theologians. They are open to such truths, and God impresses them gladly on their hearts. (Humble Apologetics: Defending the Faith Today [Oxford University Press, 2002], 150).

   However, there is some evidence that the rightly revered nineteenth century Dutch Reformed theologians, Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck, were guilty of fideistic tendencies. (Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 98-100). Accordingly, Dulles writes:

   [B. B.] Warfield, while greatly admiring Kuyper and Bavinck, criticizes their views on faith and reason. The Amsterdam theologians, he objects, indulge a mystical tendency that substitutes the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit for the objective grounds perceptible to reason. . . . The Holy Spirit does not produce faith without grounds but enables us to grasp the objective validity of the grounds (99).

   Dulles writes of a similar exchange between the fideistic tendencies of Jürgen Moltman who seems to promote “hope in our hope,” and Wolfhart Pannenberg who wrote: “Faith as pure risk would be blind credulity.” (Ibid., 161-4). ↑

6. Peter Kreeft & Ronald Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics (InterVarsity Press, 1994), 32. ↑

7. For further discussion on the relationship between reason and the interpretation of Scripture see chapter 3.3. ↑

8. For further discussion on popular but unbiblical decision making practices see Book 14. ↑

9. Regarding inclusivism see section 6.10.B. ↑

10. For further discussion of the “testimony of the Spirit” theory see chapter 3.4. ↑

11. For further discussion of Reformed epistemology see chapter 2.8. ↑

12. Concerning the place that reason and evidence plays in biblical faith see chapters 6.12-6.14. ↑

13. Donald Bloesch, The Holy Spirit (InterVarsity Press, 2000), 47. ↑

14. William Dever, Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed. David N. Freedman, vol. I (Doubleday, 1992), 366. ↑

15. Erwin Lutzer, Seven Reasons Why You Can Trust the Bible (Moody, 1998), 55. ↑

16. Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/ dictionary/paradox. ↑

17. Rob Bell, Velvet Elvis—Rethinking the Christian Faith (Zondervan, 2005), 34, italics in original. ↑

18. Augustine, City of God (online at http://www.ccel.org), xxii.7. ↑

19. J. Oliver Buswell, A Christian View of Being and Knowing: An Introduction to Philosophy (Zondervan, 1960), 192. ↑

20. Bruce Demarest and Gordon R. Lewis, Integrative Theology, 3 Vols. (Zondervan, 1987, 1990, 1994), III.81. ↑

21. Robert L. Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Thomas Nelson, 1998), 730. ↑

22. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ the Center, (Harper & Row, 1966), 114. ↑

23. John Gerstner, The Rational Biblical Theology of Jonathan Edwards, 3 vols. (Berea, 1991), I.98. ↑

24. Regarding the historical doctrine of the clarity (perspicuity) of Scripture see chapter 3.3. ↑

25. See the 1978 Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy online at http://www.reformed.org/documents/index.html?mainframe=http://www.reformed.org/documents/icbi.html. ↑

26. C. F. Keil and Frantz Delitzsch, Commentary on the Old Testament, Electronic Edition STEP Files CD-ROM (Findex.com, 2000) ↑

27. Albert Barnes, Barnes’ Notes on the Old Testament, Electronic Edition STEP Files CD-ROM (Findex.Com, 1999) ↑

28. Keil and Delitzsch reconcile Proverbs 26:4-5 as follows:

    The sic et non here lying before us is easily explained; after, or according to his folly, is this second time equivalent to, as is due to his folly: decidedly and firmly rejecting it, making short work with it (returning a sharp answer), and promptly replying in a way fitted, if possible, to make him ashamed. Thus one helps him, perhaps, to self-knowledge; while, in the contrary case, one gives assistance to his self-importance.

    The Talmud, Schabbath 30b, solves the contradiction by referring v. 4 to worldly things, and v. 5 to religious things; and it is true that, especially in the latter case, the answer is itself a duty toward the fool, and towards the truth.

    Otherwise the Midrash: one ought not to answer when one knows the fool as such, and to answer when he does not so know him; for in the first instance the wise man would dishonour himself by the answer, in the latter case he would give to him who asks the importance appertaining to a superior. ↑

29. For further discussion of the biblical nature of truth see chapter 2.4, especially section E. On the importance of using logic and reason for the correct interpretation of Scripture see chapter 3.3. For the biblical relationship between faith and human reason see chapters 6.12-6.15. ↑

30. There is no recognition of reality for humans apart from logic. This is why even philosophers such as Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and Kierkegaard (1813-1855) logically reasoned to their conclusion about the primacy of feelings, even though they disparaged the use of this very faculty in their philosophies. William Abraham even tries to suggest that Descartes (1596-1650) did not depend on reasoning for the foundation of his philosophies, yet Descartes himself describes it as follows:

    I had persuaded myself [which involved reason] that there was nothing at all in the world: no sky, no earth, no minds or bodies; was I not, therefore, also persuaded that I did not exist? No indeed; I existed without doubt, by the fact that I was persuaded [reasoned], or indeed by the mere fact that I thought [reasoned] at all. (The Meditations [Penguin, 1968], 103).

    Abraham comments, “Descartes’ discovery was unearthed by intuition, not by inference; hence it did not depend on the reliability of his reasoning faculties.” (Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology : From the Fathers to Feminism [Clarendon Press, 1998], 171). Such a statement seems inexplicable coming from such an expert Christian epistemologists, as Descartes surely used his reason to arrive at even his most basic conclusions. Human “intuition” does not bypass human reasoning. ↑

31. Some will wish to deny our claim that, “logical consistency is the basis of all we believe,” based on the fact that in their experience they feel they have believed two contradictory things. We would question this. First of all, we would wonder if they really do believe something that they view as contradictory to something else they think they believe. God simply did not make us like this.

    However, we can note here the place of the subconscious part of our mind. In other words, there are beliefs lodged in parts of our mind that we are not consciously aware of and that may dictate a great deal of our life. We may, for example, grasp with some certainty in our conscious mind that God loves us. But negative experiences and false messages about God’s love that have been stuffed into the recesses of our subconscious mind will keep us from really believing it wholeheartedly. This is why when we speak of the human mind and heart we must take into consideration both its conscious and subconscious aspects in order to really understand our God-given design and how to help people change. For further discussion of the subconscious mind see section 4.B.2.

    Finally, if we act or decide contrary to what we think we believe, we need to recognize the influence that corrupting feelings or desires can have in overriding our true beliefs. For further discussion of influences on our reason see sections 4.1.B; 4.4.C; 4.5.C; 4.6.C. ↑

32. Excerpted from section 2.4.E. ↑

33. Ronald Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of Man (Zondervan, 1982), 111. ↑

34. Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach (Harper & Row, 1979), 421, 461. ↑

35. Rogers & McKim, 49. ↑

36. Excerpt from section 2.4.E. ↑

37. Sproul et. al., 82. ↑

38. R. C. Sproul, “Biblical Interpretation and the Analogy of Faith” in Inerrancy and Common Sense, Roger R. Nicole and J. Ramsey Michaels eds. (Baker, 1980), 124. ↑

39. Robert Van Kampen, The Sign (Crossway, 1992), 8. ↑

40. Dave Hunt, What Love is This? (Berean Call, 2006), 28-29 ↑

41. Reymond, 104. ↑

42. Cornelius Van Til, Common Grace and the Gospel (Presbyterian and Reformed, 1973), 9, 142, 165-6. Emphasis original. Reymond adds that:

    Happily, and not unexpectedly, Van Til’s practice here is much better than his theory. In fact, John M. Frame in his Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought, 161-65, demonstrates that Van Til is “one of the most systematic of thinkers, stressing logical relationships among doctrines more than almost any other recent theologian” (162). ↑

43. J. I. Packer, Evangelism & the Sovereignty of God (Inter-Varsity, 1961), 22. ↑

44. John Piper, “A Response to J.I. Packer on the So-Called Antinomy Between the Sovereignty of God and Human Responsibility,” online at http://www.desiringgod.org/resource-library/articles/a-response-to-ji-packer-on-the-so-called-antinomy-between-the-sovereignty-of-god-and-human-responsibility ↑

45. David Basinger, “Biblical Paradox: Does Revelation Challenge Logic?,” JETS 30:2 (June 1987), 213. ↑

46. Ibid. ↑

47. Ibid., 205. ↑

48. Ibid., 208-9. Dr. Basinger adds: “For a fuller discussion of this distinction between complementarity and contradiction see J. Hass, “Complementarity and Christian Thought,” Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 35 (December 1983) 203-209.” ↑

49. Reymond, 105. Dr. Basinger notes that there are several respected theologians who do not see apparent contradictions in Scripture and adds:

    Most conservative Christians agree that the Bible is the authoritative word of God and, thus, that whatever is actually revealed therein must be accepted as true. But not all conservative Christians believe that the Bible clearly asserts truths that can never be shown to be compatible from a human perspective.

    Let us consider, for example, the apparent incompatibility between total divine control and meaningful human freedom. The theologians of paradox seem to hold that revelation requires us to affirm both in a sense that makes them inconsistent from a human perspective. But some Reformed theologians such as John Feinberg strongly disagree [Predestination and Free Will, ed. D. and R. Basinger (InterVarsity, 1986), 19-43].

    It is not that they challenge the authority of Scripture. And they are perfectly willing to accept the fact that God’s ways are above our ways. What they challenge is the indeterministic view of freedom being presupposed. Freedom, they argue, must be defined deterministically [by God in His sovereignty]. And once this is done, any semblance of a contradiction between human freedom and divine control disappears.

    In short, for many theologians, to deny that the Bible presents us with truths that are irreconcilable at the human level is not, as Packer implies, to hesitate to “trust what [God] says.” [Evangelism 24]. (Basinger, 212). ↑

50. Reymond, 105-106. ↑

51. Ibid., 108 ↑

52. Basinger, 208. ↑

53. Walter Kaiser and Moises Silva, Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics (Zondervan, 2007), 244-6. ↑

54. Reymond, 106-7, 110. ↑

55. Ibid., 107-109. ↑

56. Donald Guthrie, The Letter to the Hebrews (TNTC), (Eerdmans, 1983, repr. 1999), 227. ↑

57. Paul Feinberg in Five Views, 67-68. ↑

58. For further discussion of the relationship between the reason and will see section 4.1.B. ↑

59. William Abraham, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (Prentice-Hall, 1985), 103. ↑

60. D. M. Lloyd-Jones, The Sovereign Spirit: Discerning the Gifts (Harold Shaw, 1985), 72. ↑

61. Warfield, IX:15. ↑

62. Donald Bloesch, The Ground of Certainty (Eerdmans, 1971), 188, 190. ↑

63. C. S. Lewis, The Joyful Christian (Touchstone, 1977, 1996), 129. ↑

64. Our topic here is closely related with our discussion of the place of Spirit-liberated reason in saving faith in chapter 4.16. ↑