Chapter 4.2

Misconceptions of the “Heart”

The Error of “Faculty Psychology”

Overall Objective

This section may only be of interest to the more philosophically minded and can be skipped without great harm. However, it does point out the inaccurate and misleading ways that the functions of the “heart” are commonly spoken of in much Christian literature, including how the important concept of faith is understood.

Table of Topics

A) There is Not a “Will” Apart From or Against Our Reason

B) The “Heart” is the “Head”

C) There is No “Biblical Psychology”

D) The “Heart” is the Whole Person in Relation to God

E) Different Functions, not Faculties of the Heart are to be Distinguished

F) Faith is Not Dependent on a “Will” but Reason

Publications & Particulars

Primary Points

• Many theologians throughout history have distinguished between different faculties of the “heart”; i.e. reason & will.
• Many describe the human “will” and reason working separately and even against each other in a kind of competition. Such a view can lead to the claim that this “will” dominates our reason, something that can lead to the deceptive and harmful philosophy of voluntarism.
• From a biblical perspective our head is our “heart.” Nonetheless, some will suggest that beliefs in our “heart” are stronger and more important than the beliefs in our “head.”
• The majority of Christian theologians have concluded that God has not been interested in revealing detailed “biblical psychology,” preferring to view man as a whole related to God.
• While it is common to ascribe our desires to a human “will,” this is misleading because all desires actually arise from decisions made with our reason. Accordingly, there is really no reason to even speak of a human faculty of the “will.”
• When Scripture appears to distinguish between “mind,” “heart,” “spirit,” etc. it would seem the best explanation is that the Bible is not distinguishing different human faculties, but rather different functions of the human “heart.”
• It is wrong to imply, as many do, that the desires of our “will” can conflict with the decisions of our reason.

A) There is Not a “Will” Apart From or Against our Reason

Most theologians throughout the history of the Church have described the workings of the “heart” as the function of distinguishable and exclusive parts or faculties within it. This is most clearly illustrated in comparisons made between our reason (intellect) and will (volition), or our “head” and our “heart.”

For example, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) wrote under the heading: “Whether the Will Moves the Intellect”:

The intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. [On the other hand] The will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul [because] the object of the will is . . . the end [goal] in general, and each power [including reason] is directed to some suitable [goal] proper to it [the will]. . . . Therefore, the will as an agent [faculty, part of the “heart”] moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts [including the reason]. ^[1]

Aquinas is clearly describing two parts of the “heart” (reason and will), not only distinguished from each other, but influencing each other.

Likewise, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) viewed the “heart” or “soul” as he called it, as consisting of two faculties or parts, the “understanding” (i.e. reason) and the “will.” Accordingly he wrote:

God has endued the soul with two faculties: one is that by which it is capable of perception and speculation, or by which it discerns, and views, and judges of things; which is called the understanding [reason].

The other faculty is that by which the soul does not merely perceive and view things, but is some way inclined with respect to the things it views or considers; either is inclined to them, or is disinclined and averse from them; or is the faculty by which the soul does not behold things, as an indifferent unaffected spectator [like the understanding], but either as liking or disliking, pleased or displeased, approving or rejecting. This faculty is called by various names; it is sometimes called the inclination and, as it has respect to the actions that are determined and governed by it, is called the will. ^[2]

More recently, the Christian philosopher J. P. Moreland can be quoted as saying: “By reason, I simply mean the faculties, in isolation or in combination, I use to gain knowledge and justify my beliefs.” ^[3] Finally, we will quote the Reformed theologian John Frame who writes:

God gives us multiple faculties to serve as a sort of internal system of checks and balances. Sometimes reason saves us from emotional craziness, but [the faculty of] emotions can also check the extravagant pretenses of reason. ^[4]

Many, many more examples could be found throughout the whole history of Christian theology and philosophy, making one very reluctant to disagree with their approach. However, for reasons given below, we are led to do so.

Such “faculty psychology” as it has been called, leads to several other ways of describing how the human “heart” works. For example, many describe these workings as the human “will” and human reason working separately and even against each other in a kind of competition. Such a view can lead to the claim that this “will” dominates our reason, something that can lead to the deceptive and harmful philosophy of voluntarism. ^[5]

A more familiar effect of “faculty psychology” is the common distinction made between our metaphorical “heart” and “head” (mind) as if desires, emotions, and our “true beliefs” come from the former, and merely our understanding or reasoning processes occur in the latter. This can even lead to referring to the human “heart” as something rather distinguishable and superior to the human mind, therefore disparaging the God-given place of the mind and reason.

For example, while the popular Christian author John Eldredge has some eloquent and at times helpful things to say about the human “heart” in his book, Waking the Dead, he also seems guilty of many of the misunderstandings we wish to point out here. Accordingly, he writes:

Your mind tells you that it is now 2:00 A.M. and your daughter has not returned, for the car is not in the driveway. Your heart wrestles with whether or not it is cause for worry. ^[6]

The mind is a faculty, and a magnificent one at that. But the heart is the dwelling place of our true beliefs. ^[7]

[R]emember again that the heart is central. Not the mind, not the will. The heart. ^[8]

Such distinctions normally serve an author’s intention to devalue human reason and exalt desires and emotions, as Mr. Eldredge attempts to do throughout his book. In reality, however, as we demonstrate throughout this book, human reason is the source of desires and ultimately emotions, and is superior and prior to both. It would seem these authors attempt to limit human reason to the task of collecting data. On the contrary, as we wrote in the previous chapter:

It is our reason which not only seeks, researches, and receives data, but also evaluates and makes judgments upon it in order to produce what we believe, which is the foundation of what we desire and will feel—all occurring in our reason. Everything that is commonly described as a function of a “will” as distinguished from our reason, is actually a function of the latter (including decisions and desires), therefore making the concept of a “will” inaccurate and misleading. ^[9]

B) The “Heart” is the “Head”

Several misunderstandings can arise if we do not keep in mind the unity of the “heart” in the faculty of human reason. For example, when we differentiate our will, reason, and emotions, it can suggest that we are speaking of distinct physical parts of our human makeup. This again results in the common, but inaccurate metaphor mentioned above that we reason with our “head” (reason) and desire and feel with our “heart” (will). On the contrary, the reason is the place where all of these functions are decided and produced. We think with our reason, we desire with our reason, and our reason ultimately determines our feelings based on its beliefs and desires in relation to its evaluation of our circumstances. Therefore, our feelings and desires come from our head, not our chest. Thus our definition of the “heart” is the reasoning functions of our inner life that direct our outer life. From a biblical perspective our head is our “heart.”

Let us take for example Christ’s statement that, “the first and greatest commandment” is to “Love the Lord your God with all your heart [kardia] and with all your soul [psuchē] and with all your mind [dianoia]” (Matt 22:37-8). While it is admittedly difficult (if not impossible) to clearly distinguish between the elements He lists, the King is not differentiating between three different faculties in the human body. All of the functions of the “heart” and “soul” occur in our mind/reason. More to our current point, the human “heart” is nothing more or less than our human mind/reason.

However, it is also true that in biblical language the human mind/reason is often synonymous with the human “heart.” ^[10] In other words, all biblical words used to refer to the human mind/reason can include the idea of it being a source of desires, as well as understanding. ^[11] Therefore, whenever the Scriptures use the terms “heart” or “mind” the context must determine what mental function (not faculty) is being referred to, whether it be thinking, desiring, or feeling. And because there is no distinction between the head and “heart” in reality or Scripture, we can refer to all mental functions as occurring in the “heart.”

Nonetheless, some will suggest that beliefs in our “heart” are stronger and more important than the beliefs in our “head.” However, this may be confusing the difference between the opinions we understand and the ones we accept as true and therefore believe. Or, our reason simply evaluates different beliefs based on their importance to us. Accordingly, the competition popularly described as occurring between our “head” and “heart” would best be understood as merely the conflict between various beliefs in our reason.

Contrary to Mr. Eldredge then, it is our mind/reason that “wrestles with whether or not” something “is cause for worry,” and such a decision does not occur in any way apart from our reason. Neither is the “heart . . . the dwelling place of our true beliefs” as opposed to our mind/reason. Nor then is the “heart . . . central” and more important than “the mind” or “the will” as he claims. Such language is not only inaccurate but unhelpful. It would seem better to claim, as we do, that at the bottom of all of these elements is the beliefs produced by our reason.

C) There is No “Biblical Psychology”

In an effort to better understand humans from a biblical perspective, many have sought to find a “biblical psychology” of the human “heart.” It is perhaps the rich variety of words that the Bible uses to describe the inner workings of the “heart” (e.g. spirit, soul, mind, “heart,” inner man, etc) that have enhanced a desire to over-distinguish them. However, the majority of Christian theologians who have studied this topic have concluded that God has not been all that interested in revealing such intricate distinctions.

Accordingly, in the entry for “heart” in the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology (EDT) we read: “There is no systematized or scientific psychology in the Bible.” ^[12] Under the same heading in the New Bible Dictionary we note: “

The Hebrews thought in terms of subjective experience rather than objective, scientific observation, and thereby avoided the modern error of over-departmentalization [of the “heart”]. ^[13]

Along these lines, Reformed theologian Anthony Hoekema in his very good book, Created in God’s Image, remarks:

From the standpoint of analytic psychology and physiology the usage of [Scripture] is chaotic: it is the nightmare of the anatomist when any part can stand at any moment for the whole. . . . It is therefore not possible to construct an exact, scientific, biblical psychology.

Some have attempted to do so; most notable among them is [the highly respected OT scholar] Franz Delitzsch, whose System of Biblical Psychology was originally published in 1855. But even Delitzsch had to admit that “the Scripture is no scholastic book of science” and that “it is true that on psychological subjects, just as little as on dogmatical or ethical, does Scripture comprehend any system propounded in the language of the schools.” . . .

[Biblical] terms . . . describe man in his unity and wholeness, though looking at him from slightly different aspects. H. Wheeler Robinson comments: “It is not possible to give any exact differentiation of the provinces covered by ‘heart,’ . . . for the simple reason that such exact differentiation was never made.”

What we ought to observe . . . is that the Bible does not describe man scientifically; in fact, the general judgment [of theologians] is that the Bible gives us no scientific teaching about man, no “anthropology” that would or could be in competition with a scientific investigation of man in the various aspects of his existence or with philosophical anthropology. ^[14]

Likewise, the renowned Dutch Reformed scholar G. C. Berkouwer writes:

There have been constant attempts . . . to search through the Biblical conceptual material bearing on man in order to introduce system, and to deduce a clear-cut anthropology or psychology.

But these attempts have only made clear that because of the great variety of concepts used in the Bible, it is not possible to synthesize them into a systematic Biblical anthropology in which the structure and composition of man would be made clear. Robinson even speaks of a “chaotic” use of terms, and though such an expression perhaps too much implies a scientific context of fixed usage, his meaning is clear enough: the Biblical concepts cannot be systematized to yield a clear insight into the different parts of man.

It is obviously not the intention of the divine revelation to give us exact information about man in himself and thus to anticipate what later scientific research on man offers. The Scriptural anthropological concepts which vary so extremely never occur in a context which is concerned with the composition of man as such, in himself. God’s revelation directs our glance towards man in his totality, in his relation to God. ^[15]

A point which leads to our next topic.

D) The “Heart” is the Whole Person in Relation to God

Dr. Berkouwer goes on to suggest that “faculty psychology” is not only unbiblical, but has man-centered values which suggest humans as existing separately from God:

[W]e can never gain a clear understanding of the mystery of man if, in one way or another, we abstract mere components of the whole man. . . . To gain orientation on this matter, we may perhaps begin best with what is generally called the “Biblical view of man.” . . .

The characteristic of the Biblical view lies precisely in this, that man appears as related to God in all his creaturely relationships. . . . This point of view is so central and dominant for the Word of God that it never gives us a neutral independent analysis of man in order to inform us as to the components and structure of humanness in itself. . . and . . . prevent[s] us from ever viewing man in himself, apart from his relation to God. . . .

It is indeed true that various aspects of humanness are spoken of in very concrete and extremely varied ways, but the decisive question is this, whether the intent of the Biblical witness is to reveal to us something of the composition of man, or whether it makes use of this composition as an anthropological given only incidentally, in order to speak of man as a whole.

We can say that in our times, under the influence of Biblical research, a fairly general consensus of opinion has arisen among theologians. They are increasingly conscious of the fact that the Biblical view of man shows him to us in an impressive diversity, but that it never loses sight of the unity of the whole man, but rather brings it out and accentuates it.

No part of man is emphasized as independent of other parts; not because the various parts are not important, but because the Word of God is concerned precisely with the whole man in his relation to God. Thus the various terms and concepts it makes use of give us no exactly expressed or scientifically useful definitions, but rather are related always to the same basic reality of humanness; so that despite the various shifts in terminology, we never receive the impression that we are dealing with an important shift in the portrayal of man. . . .

We come to the conclusion, then, that the great variation of Biblical usage gives us no occasion to read into this variation all sorts of scientific definitions of structure which can serve as the basis for a scientific Biblical anthropology. ^[16]

E) Different Functions, not Faculties of the Heart are to be Distinguished

While the Scriptures describe different functions of the “heart” emanating from such things as the human mind or spirit, these are not meant to refer to different faculties or parts of us. Therefore, it is simply wrong to speak of a human “will” as distinguishable and/or in competition with human reason. Rather, the “will,” if the term is to be used at all, is synonymous with the “heart,” depicting the whole person. Accordingly, the renowned Reformed theologian J. I. Packer writes:

It is worth observing that will is an abstraction. My will is not a part of me which I choose to move or not to move, like my hand or my foot; it is precisely me choosing to act and then going into action. ^[17]

Likewise, the respected NT scholar E. F. Harrison writes in the EDT under “will”: “The present trend in psychology is away from the notion of will as a faculty and toward the viewpoint that it is an expression of the total self or personality.” ^[18] Therefore, we should always speak of the desires of a person, not of a “will.”

More than this, we would claim again that while it is common to ascribe our desires to a human “will,” this is misleading because all desires actually arise from decisions made with our reason. Accordingly, there is really no reason to even speak of a human faculty of the “will.”

Even secular authorities avoid referring to a “will” as a faculty. Accordingly, Webster’s variously defines it as:

Mental powers [not a faculty] manifested as wishing, choosing, desiring, or intending. A disposition to act according to principles or ends . . . the power of control over one’s own actions or emotions. ^[19]

All of these actions can best be defined as the result of logical decisions processed and produced by our reason.

If the biblical authors had no intention of defining a clear biblical psychology or distinguishing between different faculties such as a human “will” and reason, then how do we explain those Scriptures that seem to make such distinctions?

For example, the King says we are to “Love the Lord your God with all your heart [kardia] and with all your soul [psuchē] and with all your mind [dianoia]” (Matt 22:37). Are we to understand Him to mean these are all exclusive and distinctive parts of humans? In agreement with the consensus of most NT scholars we do not think so. Most think such language is intended to be rather synonymous without making any real distinctions at all. ^[20] However, a better explanation would seem to be that while the King is not distinguishing different human faculties, He is distinguishing the different functions of the human “heart.”

Therefore, we would interpret His reference to the “mind” as describing the beliefs of reason, a conclusion that is supported by Christ’s conspicuous use of dianoia (understanding, reason) rather than the more common and general nous for mind. ^[21] His references to the “heart” and “soul” could be seen as pointing to the desires and emotions respectively, both terms being used as the source of these things (cf. Rom 9:2; 10:1; Matt 12:28; 26:38; John 12:27; Heb 10:38; Acts 4:32).

We would suggest the same is true when the Apostle at times distinguishes between different aspects of the “heart.” For example, he tells those who would correctly pray that: “the peace of God, which transcends all understanding [noun: “mind”], will guard your hearts [kardias] and your minds [noēmata: “thoughts”] in Christ Jesus” (Phil 4:7). There is a lot of psychology in such a statement, but again we do not believe the Apostle is suggesting that the “hearts” of people are to be distinguished as a separate part of them from their “minds.” Rather, by “hearts” he is referring to our desires and emotions, and by “minds” to our beliefs, all of which are ultimately produced by reason. ^[22] While the suggestion that beliefs are being mentioned here may seem odd, it would seem almost demanded by the foundational place these have in our spiritual health, which is what the Apostle is prescribing here.

Also, there is a rather odd statement by the Apostle in the context of praying in an incoherent tongue:

For if I pray in a tongue, my spirit [pneuma] prays, but my mind [nous] is unfruitful. So what shall I do? I will pray with my spirit, but I will also pray with my mind; I will sing with my spirit, but I will also sing with my mind. If you are praising God with your spirit, how can one who finds himself among those who do not understand say “Amen” to your thanksgiving, since he does not know what you are saying? (1 Cor 14:14-16)

While such language would suggest different human faculties operating in distinction from each other (a “spirit” vs. a “mind,”) how would we clearly define, distinguish, and locate them? As we discuss elsewhere, we believe that the Apostle is simply saying that one can pray with a lot of subconscious emotion (i.e. “with my spirit”) and very little conscious understanding (“with my mind”). ^[23] Therefore, it would seem best to interpret the Apostle as not advocating a “faculty psychology” but simply contrasting different functions of the “heart” (i.e. our beliefs vs. our emotions).

Such “faculty psychology” is especially tempting when it comes to references to the “conscience.” Particularly the Apostle Paul’s numerous references to it can imply a different mental faculty or part of the mind processing moral knowledge (cf. Rom 2:14-15; 9:1; 13:5; 1 Cor 8:7, 10, 12; 10:25, 27, 28, 29 (twice); 2 Cor 1:12; 4:2; 5:11; 1 Tim 1:5, 19; 3:9; 4:2; 2 Tim 1:3; Tit 1:15). The term appears another five times in Hebrews, three times in Peter, and two in Acts. Obviously it is a very important NT concept.

The Greek word used and translated “conscience” is syneidēsis which comes from oida “to know” and syn “with” giving a literal meaning of “to know with.” Accordingly, the NIDNTT relates that in classical Greek:

Originally syneidēsis appears to focus on self knowledge: the capacity to relate to oneself, especially when one looks back at one’s own past. This looking back did not stop short with ascertaining facts, but led to evaluations and judgments about the criterion of good and evil. Hence, the word gradually acquired the current moral meaning of conscience. ^[24]

In other words, the Greek concept came to mean “knowing oneself,” referring to the unique human ability to evaluate ourselves morally.

Unfortunately, however, many have followed the ancient Greeks in understanding or at least implying that the conscience is a separate faculty or part of humans rather than a different function of reason. For example, the highly respected Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Early Christian Literature Greek (BDAG) defines syneidēsis as: ““the inward faculty of distinguishing right from wrong.” ^[25] Likewise, Vine’s Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words defines it as, “that faculty by which we apprehend the will of God.” ^[26] Also, the EDT defines the term as, “that faculty by which one distinguishes between the morally right and wrong.” ^[27] We believe all of these references would have been more accurate to define syneidēsis (“a moral knowing of oneself) as a different function of reason, not a different faculty of humans.

Accordingly, in the OT, the function of conscience is described as occurring in the “heart” (cf. 2 Sam 24:10; Job 27:6; Ps 32:1-5; 51:1-9). Likewise, Archibald Alexander (1772-1851), the first Professor of Princeton Theological Seminary, wrote:

We have not one faculty by which we discern physical truths, another by which we judge of mathematical theorems, and another for matters of taste; but all these are the one and the same understanding, exercised on different objects. Accordingly, when moral qualities are the objects of our contemplation, it is not a different faculty from the reason or understanding which thinks and judges, but the same, exercised on other subjects; and the only difference is in the object. Our conclusion therefore is, that so far as conscience is an intellectual act or judgment of the mind, so far it belongs to the understanding. ^[28]

Along the same lines, Gordon Clark (1902-1985) wrote:

Faculty psychology, largely abandoned now, invented parts or faculties of the soul for various acts, while the Scripture, as I understand it, has the unitary soul or mind [i.e. reason] acting on various objects. For example, conscience is not a faculty of the soul for morality and intellect a separate faculty for geometry. Rather the distinction is that in the first case the mind [i.e. reason] studies matters of morality, while in the second the same unitary mind [i.e. reason] studies geometry. This view is consonant with the idea that faith in pickles and faith in God are psychologically identical; the difference lies in the object. ^[29]

Likewise, C. S. Lewis (1898-1963) wrote:

Besides reasoning about matters of fact, men also make moral judgments-‘I ought to do this’-‘I ought not to do that’-‘This is good’-‘That is evil’. Two views have been held about moral judgments. Some people think that when we make them we are not using our Reason, but are employing some different power. Other people think that we make them by our Reason. I myself hold this second view. That is, I believe that the primary moral principles on which all others depend are rationally perceived. . . . Their intrinsic reasonableness shines by its own light. It is because all morality is based on such self-evident principles that we say to a man, when we would recall him to right conduct, ‘Be reasonable’. ^[30]

There is an important point being made here. The term “conscience” is especially prone to being thought of as a separate faculty or part of the mind. On the contrary, all reasoning, including moral reasoning, is performed by the same faculty that does any reasoning, the mind. ^[31]

F) Faith is Not Dependent on a “Will” but Reason

The fact that there is no human faculty or function of “will” apart from reason significantly affects how the concept of “faith” is generally perceived. The traditional understanding of faith is described by R. C. Sproul who writes:

Building upon Augustine’s understanding of the multi-faceted character of faith, the Reformers isolated three key elements in authentic faith: notitia, assensus, and fiducia. Notitia refers to the data (notae) or content of the Christian faith. New Testament faith is not empty of content . . .

The second aspect of faith which follows upon notitia is assensus. As the Latin suggests, assensus refers to the element of faith which involves the assent of the intellect to the truth of the data. . . .

The third aspect of faith is most crucial. . . . Fiducia refers to the personal trust dimension of faith. The English derivative is the word fiduciary which places the emphasis on trust. . . . This aspect involves the mind but goes beyond the intellect to the heart, the will, the affections– to one’s personal inclination toward Christ. ^[32]

Again, there is an implication that faith is produced somewhere apart from our “intellect” or “mind” (i.e. reason) and actually in our “heart” or “the will.” This can again lead to the disparagement of the place of reason in God-pleasing biblical faith. The extreme of this is fideism in which faith becomes an act against or apart from reason. ^[33]

Nonetheless, it is common to hear claims that faith is something more than reasoning. Accordingly, theologian Murray Rae writes, “Christian faith cannot be reduced to a work of the intellect.” ^[34] Likewise, Geoffrey Bromiley writes in the International Standard Bible Encyclopedia:

[W]hile faith must include an intellectual element, i.e., the reception of the words and works fulfilled in Christ, recorded in Holy Scripture, and proclaimed in genuine preaching, a mere assent to the body of facts and truths herein contained is very much less than faith. ^[35]

Likewise, in a discussion of the ingredients of faith, J. P. Moreland has written:

Fiducia . . . involves personal commitment to its object, whether to a truth or a person. Fiducia is essentially a matter of the will, because Christianity is a relationship with a Person and not just commitment to a set of truths (though this is, of course, essential). ^[36]

On the contrary, faith is simply a decision, and all decisions are made by our reason. And the fact that Christian faith involves believing in a Person does not change this, as beliefs in people, God, or things are all processed and decided upon in the same way by reason. Along the same lines, we reject elsewhere the neo-orthodox idea that believing in a Person like God is different than believing in things. ^[37]

Along these lines, Reformed theologian Robert Reymond writes:

Gordon H. Clark in Religion, Reason and Revelation, basing his conclusion on the fact that the Bible’s “heart” is semantically equivalent not to one’s emotions but to one’s deepest self with a preponderant emphasis even here upon the intellect of the self, argues that even fiducia [trust], as well as notitia [understanding] and assensus [rational conviction], is essentially intellectual. With this I concur, but I would urge that this intellectual fiducia includes affective and volitional dimensions [not faculties], since the Apostle insists that the saved must not simply know about and believe in but also love the Lord Jesus Christ (I Cor. 16:22). ^[38]

And with both Drs. Clark and Reymond we would concur as well.

Therefore, it is wrong to imply, as many do, that the desires of our “will” can conflict with the decisions of our reason. For example, many will explain the choice to smoke dangerous cigarettes in this way. The suggestion is that the desires of the “will” override the beliefs of reason, leading to the decision to smoke. On the contrary, first, beliefs, desires, and decisions are all produced by reason. Secondly, as described above, a decision to smoke in the face of warnings simply reflects conflicting beliefs of reason, not a “will” against our reason.

Publications & Particulars

1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I.82.4; online at http://www.newadvent.org/summa. However, Aquinas concluded his discussion of the relationship between reason and a “will” by saying:

   There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect [reason] as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will.

   While we can appreciate his conclusion of the primacy of reason, he finds it only in reason’s ability to understand, and neglects its ultimate power to make decisions, which evidently he ascribes to a “will” which is a result of the “faculty psychology” reflected here. ↑

2. Jonathan Edwards A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections (I.1.) (online at ccel.org). In addition, Edwards reflects the same “faculty psychology” in his treatise A Divine and Supernatural Light. See Growing in God’s Spirit, T. M. Moore, ed. (Presbyterian & Reformed, 2003), 26, 45-6. ↑

3. J. P. Moreland, Love Your God With All Your Mind: The Role of Reason in the Life of the Soul (NavPress, 1997), 43. ↑

4. John Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Presbyterian and Reformed, 1987), 336. ↑

5. In the Evangelical Dictionary of Theology (EDT) we read:

   Stemming from the Latin word voluntas, meaning will, voluntarism is a general name for a variety of philosophical positions united in their emphasis on will. In contrast to the dominant rationalistic, intellectualist stream of Western thought reaching back to Plato and beyond, voluntarism boldly asserts the superiority or importance of the exercise of will to the deliberations of reason. . . .

   In theology and religious philosophy voluntarism is significant in several contexts. Some have claimed that logic and the laws of reason hold only because God wills them so; God could assert his will and change them were he so to choose. This position, held by the medieval Peter Damien and others, was discussed by Descartes, and has been soundly opposed by contemporary evangelical Gordon Clark in his Reason, Religion, and Revelation.

   Other voluntarists hold that we need not have rational grounds for religious belief, but may justifiably assert our wills to make a religious commitment, a view titled fideism. Such a doctrine in various forms has a long history in Christian thought, and finds expression in Pascal, Kierkegaard, William James, and many contemporary evangelicals of a pietistic leaning. (D. B. Fletcher “Voluntarism,” EDT, Walter Elwell, ed. [Baker, 1984], 1147-9). ↑

6. John Eldredge, Waking the Dead (Nelson, 2003), 42. ↑

7. Ibid., 46. ↑

8. Ibid., 49. ↑

9. Quoted from section 4.1.B.4. ↑

10. Accordingly, the New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology (NIDNTT) notes that the biblical concept of heart is often synonymous with the mind (nous) or understanding (dianoia):

    [A] striking feature of the NT is the essential closeness of kardia [heart] to the concept nous, mind . . . Heart and mind (noēmata, lit. thoughts) can be used in parallel (2 Cor. 3:14f) or synonymously (Phil. 4:7). (T. Sorg, “Heart,” Colin Brown, ed., 4 vols., [Zondervan, 1986], II:182).

    Also, J. P. Moreland comments that in Scripture:

    The term heart often actually refers to the mind itself (Romans 1:21; 10:10; 2 Corinthians 4:6, 9:7; Ephesians 1:18; 4:17-18). Therefore, it is safe to say that when the term heart is used in a verse, it most likely includes or explicitly refers to our mental faculty unless the context shows otherwise. (Mind, 61). ↑

11. The NIDNTT points out that both Hebrew and Greek words referring to the mind can refer to a function of desires. In other words, from a biblical perspective, the mind is not only used to think, but to desire and feel as well. Regarding the OT view of the mind we read, “the understanding belongs with the will [sic]” (II.124), and that the use of nous in the Greek translation of the OT (LXX) to refer to the human “heart,” “shows that nous is to be understood in a sense more associated with the will [sic]” (II.125).

    Regarding the Greek word groups nous (mind) and dianoia (understanding) we read: “All in all, it may be said that the NT gives to this group of words its own interpretation. . . . The whole group of words is associated more firmly with the will [sic]” (Ibid.).

    While we disagree with the “faculty psychology” reflected here, it is clear that the mind is not just the place of the intellect, but of volition as well. (II:182) ↑

12. O. R. Brandon “Heart” EDT, 498 ↑

13. O. Banwell, “Heart” in New Bible Dictionary, J. I. Packer, et al. eds., 3rd ed., (Intervarsity, 1996), 456. ↑

14. Anthony Hoekema, Created in God’s Image (Eerdmans, 1986), 203-204, 215. ↑

15. G. C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God (Studies in Dogmatics) (Eerdmans, 1962), 199. ↑

16. Ibid., 195-7, 199-200, 207. See also Charles Hodge, Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, Electronic Edition STEP Files CD-ROM (Findex.Com, 2003), 4:17; Hoekema, 203-4. ↑

17. J. I. Packer, Concise Theology (Tyndale, 1993), 86. ↑

18. “Will” EDT, 1171. ↑

19. Webster’s online at http://www.webstersdictionary.org ↑

20. Accordingly, Dr. Carson comments on Jesus’ vocabulary in Matthew 22: “From the viewpoint of biblical anthropology, “heart,” “soul,” and “mind” (v. 37) are not mutually exclusive but overlapping categories, together demanding our love for God to come from our whole person.” (The Expositor’s Bible Commentary (EBC) Frank E. Gaebelein, ed. CD-ROM [Zondervan, n.d.], in loc.)

    Likewise, C. Ryder Smith in his entry to the NBD on “heart” writes: “The first great commandment probably means “You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, that is with all your soul and with all your mind and with all your strength” (e.g. Mk. 12:30, 33). (456) ↑

21. There may be some significance to the fact that all three Synoptic Gospels use this rather special word dianoia in the context of the greatest commandment. One might expect the more general term nous (mind), but as G. Harder notes:

    nous [mind] is capable of embracing all the instruments of sensual and conceptual perception . . . dianoia, by contrast, belongs more to the narrower, intellectual category of discursive [analytically reasoned] thought. (“Reason, Mind, Understanding,” NIDNTT, III: 122).

    In other words, there seems to be a special emphasis on the fact that we are to love God in how we “mentally reason.” ↑

22. Peter O’Brien in his NIGTC commentary on Philippians agrees that the “heart” mentioned by Paul in Phil 4:7 refers more to our emotion and the “mind” to our thinking:

    The objects of this activity are . . . lit. “your hearts and your minds”, two nouns that often overlap in meaning but that are here emphatically separated (the definite articles and the repeated pronoun [“your”]. . . . noēma seems to refer to the mind or the thinking faculty rather than the thoughts that are its product. So it may be better to regard kardia as describing the whole person from an emotional and volitional angle while noēma focuses on the mental aspects. The combined expression then refers to the whole inner life . . . (The Epistle to the Philippians [Eerdmans, 1991], 498). ↑

23. For further discussion of the emotional aspect of the contemporary phenomena of tongues see section 4.9.D. ↑

24. H-C Hahn, “Conscience,” NIDNTT, I:348. ↑

25. Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Early Christian Literature Greek (BDAG) Danker, F. W. ed., 3^rd ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 2001) ↑

26. Vine’s Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words , W. E. Vine (Thomas Nelson, 1996), 122. ↑

27. A. M. Rehwinkel, “Conscience, EDT, 267. ↑

28. Archibald Alexander, Outlines of Moral Science, ch. V; online at http://www.ccel.org. ↑

29. Clark, Faith and Saving Faith (Trinity Foundation, 1990), 78. ↑

30. C. S. Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Study, (Macmillan, 1947), 43-4. ↑

31. The above perspective also reflects the biblical psychological distinction made between regenerated and unregenerated humans. One might be led to suggest that the radical and immediate changes in desires that occur with regeneration can be explained by merely claiming that the “will” of the person has been changed, while the reasoning faculty has remained relatively unaffected, although having truth now to depend on. This is especially tempting considering the fact that the “sinful nature [sarx]” (Rom 7:5 etc.) is rather exclusively described as a source of sinful desires.

    However, such a perspective would again ignore the obvious fact that desires are the decisions of reason, and therefore references to a “sinful nature” should be viewed in a broader sense as a sinful “heart” or even ego within the person. Accordingly, Scripture uses the broader distinctions of new and old “heart,” “man,” and “self” to distinguish regenerated and unregenerated humans (cf. Ezek 36:26; Eph 4:22-24; 1 Cor 2:16).

    Likewise, some may suggest that the suppression of the message of Creation regarding God’s existence by some unregenerates (cf. Rom 1:18), can be explained by the desires of a sinful human “will” overriding the operation of human reason for which the message would otherwise be clear. While it would seem clear that perhaps certain beliefs and desires are conflicting inside such a person, all of these are, again, the products of reason, not a will. ↑

32. R. C. Sproul, John Gerstner, and Arthur Lindsey, Classical Apologetics: A Rational Defense of the Christian Faith and a Critique of Presuppositional Apologetics (Academie Books, 1984), 22. ↑

33. For further discussion of fideism see chapters 2.10 and 6.12. ↑

34. Murray Rae, “The Status of Doctrine: Kierkegaardian Explorations” in The Task of Theology Today: Doctrines and Dogmas, Victor Pfitzner and Hilary Regan eds. (Eerdmans, 1999), 219 ↑

35. Geoffrey Bromiley, “Faith,” in the International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, (ISBE), Geoffrey W. Bromiley, ed., 4 vols., (Eerdmans, 1988), II:271. ↑

36. J. P. Moreland and Klaus Issler, In Search of a Confident Faith (Intervarsity, 2008), 22. ↑

37. For further discussion of the neo-orthodox claim that believing in Christ as a Person, instead of through Scripture is to be different see section 7.7.C. ↑

38. Robert Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith (Nelson, 1998), 728. ↑